發(fā)布時間：2018-08-12 09:22

【摘要】：本文分析了公司高管團隊異質(zhì)人力資本的特殊性,根據(jù)這些特殊性基于博弈論視角分析高管團隊異質(zhì)人力資本與物質(zhì)資本的博弈過程,博弈結(jié)果表明:(1)隨股權(quán)的不斷分散,現(xiàn)代公眾公司實質(zhì)上已成為擁有異質(zhì)人力資本的高管團隊與物質(zhì)資本擁有者所形成的"不完全契約",無論物質(zhì)資本所有者擁有多大的剩余索取權(quán)與控制權(quán),都少不了異質(zhì)人力資本所有者對公司生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營的直接控制。(2)動態(tài)博弈表明,對經(jīng)營管理團隊進行"他者"監(jiān)督,精煉貝葉斯均衡不可能達到,此時,給予異質(zhì)人力資本所有者剩余分享權(quán)以提高其自我監(jiān)督的積極性是必要的。(3)擁有異質(zhì)人力資本的高管團隊對公司的所有權(quán)主要體現(xiàn)在剩余價值索取權(quán),該權(quán)利可以用薪酬水平來衡量。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the particularity of the heterogeneous human capital of the company's executive team. According to these particularities, the game process between the heterogeneous human capital and the material capital of the executive team is analyzed based on the game theory. The game results show that: (1) with the continuous dispersion of equity, In fact, modern public companies have become the "incomplete contract" between the executive team with heterogeneous human capital and the owners of physical capital, no matter how much residual claim and control rights the owners of physical capital have. (2) the dynamic game shows that the "other" supervision of the management team can not be achieved by refining Bayesian equilibrium. It is necessary to give surplus share right to the owners of heterogeneous human capital in order to improve their enthusiasm of self-supervision. (3) the ownership of the company by the executive team with heterogeneous human capital is mainly reflected in the claim of surplus value. This right can be measured by the level of pay.
【作者單位】： 滁州學(xué)院;四川大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院;
【分類號】：C931

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本文編號：2178626