高管團(tuán)隊(duì)異質(zhì)人力資本激勵(lì)機(jī)制研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-08-12 09:22
【摘要】:本文分析了公司高管團(tuán)隊(duì)異質(zhì)人力資本的特殊性,根據(jù)這些特殊性基于博弈論視角分析高管團(tuán)隊(duì)異質(zhì)人力資本與物質(zhì)資本的博弈過程,博弈結(jié)果表明:(1)隨股權(quán)的不斷分散,現(xiàn)代公眾公司實(shí)質(zhì)上已成為擁有異質(zhì)人力資本的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)與物質(zhì)資本擁有者所形成的"不完全契約",無(wú)論物質(zhì)資本所有者擁有多大的剩余索取權(quán)與控制權(quán),都少不了異質(zhì)人力資本所有者對(duì)公司生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)的直接控制。(2)動(dòng)態(tài)博弈表明,對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理團(tuán)隊(duì)進(jìn)行"他者"監(jiān)督,精煉貝葉斯均衡不可能達(dá)到,此時(shí),給予異質(zhì)人力資本所有者剩余分享權(quán)以提高其自我監(jiān)督的積極性是必要的。(3)擁有異質(zhì)人力資本的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)對(duì)公司的所有權(quán)主要體現(xiàn)在剩余價(jià)值索取權(quán),該權(quán)利可以用薪酬水平來(lái)衡量。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the particularity of the heterogeneous human capital of the company's executive team. According to these particularities, the game process between the heterogeneous human capital and the material capital of the executive team is analyzed based on the game theory. The game results show that: (1) with the continuous dispersion of equity, In fact, modern public companies have become the "incomplete contract" between the executive team with heterogeneous human capital and the owners of physical capital, no matter how much residual claim and control rights the owners of physical capital have. (2) the dynamic game shows that the "other" supervision of the management team can not be achieved by refining Bayesian equilibrium. It is necessary to give surplus share right to the owners of heterogeneous human capital in order to improve their enthusiasm of self-supervision. (3) the ownership of the company by the executive team with heterogeneous human capital is mainly reflected in the claim of surplus value. This right can be measured by the level of pay.
【作者單位】: 滁州學(xué)院;四川大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】:C931
本文編號(hào):2178626
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the particularity of the heterogeneous human capital of the company's executive team. According to these particularities, the game process between the heterogeneous human capital and the material capital of the executive team is analyzed based on the game theory. The game results show that: (1) with the continuous dispersion of equity, In fact, modern public companies have become the "incomplete contract" between the executive team with heterogeneous human capital and the owners of physical capital, no matter how much residual claim and control rights the owners of physical capital have. (2) the dynamic game shows that the "other" supervision of the management team can not be achieved by refining Bayesian equilibrium. It is necessary to give surplus share right to the owners of heterogeneous human capital in order to improve their enthusiasm of self-supervision. (3) the ownership of the company by the executive team with heterogeneous human capital is mainly reflected in the claim of surplus value. This right can be measured by the level of pay.
【作者單位】: 滁州學(xué)院;四川大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】:C931
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1 楊建芳;龔六堂;張慶華;;人力資本形成及其對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響——一個(gè)包含教育和健康投入的內(nèi)生增長(zhǎng)模型及其檢驗(yàn)[J];管理世界;2006年05期
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