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  本文選題：委托代理關(guān)系　切入點(diǎn)：過度自信　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在市場需求不確定或結(jié)果產(chǎn)出不確定時，風(fēng)險厭惡和過度自信的共存已被心理學(xué)家和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家所認(rèn)同，他們在決策者選擇最終努力的投入的過程中發(fā)揮著重要的作用。一方面，面對不確定時，風(fēng)險決策者為了防止風(fēng)險導(dǎo)致的收益損失可能會選擇規(guī)避風(fēng)險行為，另一方面，，決策者在分析不確定的信息時總是表現(xiàn)高估私人信息的準(zhǔn)確性和自己成功的幾率，過度相信自己的判斷。本文以由一個委托人和代理人組成的委托代理關(guān)系為研究框架，研究風(fēng)險厭惡態(tài)度和過度自信對委托代理雙方利益的分配和委托代理機(jī)制的設(shè)計的影響，希望能為委托人和代理人在解決與風(fēng)險厭惡和過度自信有關(guān)的一些問題提供一個理論上的指導(dǎo)。 論文首先從實(shí)踐和理論層面分析了選題的依據(jù)和意義，指出與產(chǎn)出不確定性相關(guān)的人的行為特征（過度自信和風(fēng)險態(tài)度）與委托代理模型結(jié)合的合理性和創(chuàng)新性，并綜述了委托代理的理論框架、努力水平和過度自信等方面的理論成果，為論文奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)；然后，從經(jīng)典的委托代理的框架出發(fā)，假設(shè)供應(yīng)鏈的收益是關(guān)于決策者投入的努力水平的隨機(jī)函數(shù)，決策者以最大化各自的期望利潤為決策目標(biāo)（即存在道德風(fēng)險），研究了在僅考慮決策者風(fēng)險厭惡時，探討了不同的風(fēng)險厭惡程度對決策者最優(yōu)的努力投入和收入分享系數(shù)的影響，為后續(xù)章節(jié)的研究奠定一個分析基礎(chǔ)；緊接著，考慮決策者風(fēng)險厭惡和過度自信共存，從僅代理人投入努力和代理人與委托人共同努力兩個角度出發(fā)，分析委托人和代理人不同的風(fēng)險厭惡態(tài)度和對產(chǎn)出方差不同的過度自信水平對他們投入的努力水平和收入分享系數(shù)的影響，最后，研究了在不存在道德風(fēng)險時，即假設(shè)委托人能對代理人的努力行為進(jìn)行完全監(jiān)督，委托人和代理人最優(yōu)的努力水平，并按照僅風(fēng)險厭惡和風(fēng)險厭惡與過度自信共存，僅代理人努力和委托人和代理人同時努力，有無道德風(fēng)險進(jìn)行分類，對比了在各種情形下，決策者投入的努力水平和混合報酬合同中收入分享系數(shù)的變化，據(jù)此提出本文的理論意義和管理學(xué)意義。
[Abstract]:When market demand is uncertain or results are uncertain, the coexistence of risk aversion and overconfidence has been recognized by psychologists and economists as playing an important role in the decision makers' choice of final effort inputs. In the face of uncertainty, risk decision makers may choose to avoid risk behavior in order to prevent the loss of income caused by risk, on the other hand, When analyzing uncertain information, decision makers always overestimate the accuracy of private information and their chances of success, and over-trust their own judgment. This paper takes the principal-agent relationship composed of a principal and an agent as the research framework. To study the effects of risk aversion and overconfidence on the distribution of the interests of both parties and the design of the principal-agent mechanism. This paper hopes to provide a theoretical guidance to the principal and agent in solving some problems related to risk aversion and overconfidence. Firstly, the paper analyzes the basis and significance of choosing the topic from the practical and theoretical aspects, and points out the rationality and innovation of the combination of the behavior characteristics (overconfidence and risk attitude) and the principal-agent model related to the uncertainty of output. The theoretical framework of principal-agent, the level of effort and overconfidence are summarized, which lays a theoretical foundation for the thesis. Then, from the classical principal-agent framework, Assuming that the benefit of the supply chain is a stochastic function of the level of effort invested by the decision makers, the decision makers aim at maximizing their respective expected profits (i.e., the existence of moral hazard). The influence of different degree of risk aversion on the optimal effort input and income sharing coefficient of decision makers is discussed, which lays an analytical foundation for the subsequent chapters. Then, considering the coexistence of risk aversion and overconfidence among decision makers, From the perspective of only the agent putting in effort and the agent and the principal working together, This paper analyzes the influence of different risk aversion attitude of principal and agent and overconfidence level of different variance of output on their effort level and income sharing coefficient. Finally, the paper studies the influence of different risk aversion on the level of effort and income sharing coefficient when there is no moral hazard. That is, assuming that the principal can completely supervise the agent's hard work, the principal and the agent have the optimal level of effort and coexist with overconfidence according to only risk aversion and risk aversion. Only the efforts of the agent and the principal and the agent at the same time are classified as moral hazard, and the level of effort invested by the decision maker and the change of the income sharing coefficient in the mixed reward contract are compared under various circumstances. Based on this, the theoretical significance and management significance of this paper are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F224

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