發(fā)布時間：2018-03-11 16:45

  本文選題：多渠道　切入點：促銷努力　出處：《中國流通經(jīng)濟》2017年06期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)實中很多商品都在通過多渠道銷售,但多渠道銷售盡管能夠提高供應(yīng)鏈靈活性,也會帶來渠道沖突,而價格則是導(dǎo)致渠道沖突的重要因素。對于同時開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道的單個制造商和單個零售商所組成的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),考慮零售商實體渠道促銷努力水平和消費者搭便車行為,在以制造商為主導(dǎo)的斯坦克爾伯格博弈下,依照制造商是否提供零售商網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道指導(dǎo)價格,研究各渠道定價策略可以發(fā)現(xiàn),制造商最優(yōu)利潤與促銷努力水平和搭便車消費者所占比重正相關(guān);零售商存在最佳促銷努力水平,其最優(yōu)利潤與搭便車消費者比重負相關(guān);批發(fā)價格較低時,零售商能夠接受制造商提供指導(dǎo)價格;制造商網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道基本市場份額較大時,傾向于不提供指導(dǎo)價格,份額較小時,傾向于提供指導(dǎo)價格。且總體看,盡管制造商提供指導(dǎo)價格有利于減少渠道沖突、擴大產(chǎn)品銷量,但因多數(shù)情況下會損壞零售商利益,應(yīng)通過協(xié)調(diào)契約在確保制造商和零售商網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道同價的前提下實現(xiàn)雙贏。
[Abstract]:In reality, many commodities are being sold through multiple channels, but multi-channel sales, although they can improve the flexibility of the supply chain, can also lead to channel conflicts. Price is an important factor leading to channel conflict. For a supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer that has a network channel, the level of retail sales promotion efforts and the free-rider behavior of consumers are considered. Under the Stackelberg game which is dominated by the manufacturer, according to whether the manufacturer provides the retailer network channel to guide the price, the research each channel pricing strategy can find, The optimal profit of manufacturer is positively correlated with the level of promotion effort and the proportion of hitchhiker; the retailer has the best level of promotion effort, and its optimal profit is negatively correlated with the proportion of hitchhiker; when the wholesale price is low, the optimal profit is negatively correlated with the proportion of hitchhiker. The retailer can accept the manufacturer to offer the instruction price; when the manufacturer network channel basic market share is bigger, tends not to provide the instruction price, the share is small, inclines to offer the instruction price. Although the manufacturer provides the instruction price to help reduce the channel conflict, expands the product volume, but because in most cases will damage the retailer benefit, should realize the win-win through the coordination contract under the premise which ensures the manufacturer and the retailer network channel the same price.
【作者單位】： 大連海事大學(xué)交通運輸管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金項目“大數(shù)據(jù)背景下網(wǎng)購消費者行為模式與網(wǎng)購評語引導(dǎo)機理研究”(15CGL031) 大連市科技計劃項目“基于超網(wǎng)絡(luò)的城市交通出行行為動態(tài)模型與算法研究”(2015A11GX016)
【分類號】：F274
，

本文編號：1599025