發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-01 07:09

【摘要】：對(duì)于企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，產(chǎn)品保修服務(wù)具有兩個(gè)對(duì)立的作用。一方面，保修服務(wù)能夠起到一個(gè)促銷(xiāo)的作用，提高企業(yè)的聲譽(yù)，吸引更多的消費(fèi)者，占領(lǐng)更多的市場(chǎng)份額，從而帶來(lái)更多的利潤(rùn)。另一方面，保修服務(wù)也讓企業(yè)承擔(dān)更重的售后負(fù)擔(dān)，支付高額的售后成本。企業(yè)在對(duì)保修期決策時(shí)，必須權(quán)衡兩方面的作用，聯(lián)合其他決策變量，有效優(yōu)化企業(yè)的績(jī)效。本文立足于供應(yīng)鏈視角，探討成員企業(yè)在供應(yīng)鏈環(huán)境下的生產(chǎn)\營(yíng)銷(xiāo)決策。具體的研究工作如下： 1、針對(duì)市場(chǎng)需求率受產(chǎn)品零售價(jià)格和保修期長(zhǎng)短影響的情況，利用博弈論，研究了需求受零售價(jià)格和保修期影響的兩階段供應(yīng)鏈管理。通過(guò)建立數(shù)學(xué)模型分兩種情況討論競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制：(1)制造商是Stackelberg領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，(2)零售商是Stackelberg領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，制造商和零售商以各自單位時(shí)間利潤(rùn)最大為目標(biāo)分別確定產(chǎn)品的保修期和零售價(jià)格。針對(duì)這兩種情況，求得了最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格和保修期的解析解或聯(lián)合方程。 2、針對(duì)由單個(gè)供應(yīng)商和兩個(gè)相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)制造商組成的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈，其中供應(yīng)商是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，制造商是跟隨者，生產(chǎn)兩種替代性產(chǎn)品，討論供應(yīng)商統(tǒng)一批量?jī)r(jià)格策略和制造商保修期策略。采用逆序歸納法研究該供應(yīng)鏈成員之間的博弈行為。首先，討論兩個(gè)制造商之間的博弈行為，得到了保修期最優(yōu)反應(yīng)函數(shù)和唯一的Nash均衡。然后，討論供應(yīng)商的批量?jī)r(jià)格策略，得到了具體的解析表達(dá)式。并采用數(shù)值算例，針對(duì)兩制造商的區(qū)別只是市場(chǎng)規(guī)模不同的特例，刻畫(huà)了供應(yīng)商和制造商的策略和單位時(shí)間利潤(rùn)的變化規(guī)律。
[Abstract]:For enterprises, product warranty services have two opposing roles. On the one hand, warranty service can play a promotional role, improve the reputation of enterprises, attract more consumers, occupy more market share, thereby bring more profits. On the other hand, warranty service also allows enterprises to bear a heavier after-sale burden, paying high after-sale costs. In the decision of warranty period, enterprises must balance the role of two aspects, combine other decision variables, and effectively optimize the performance of enterprises. Based on the perspective of supply chain, this paper discusses the production / marketing decisions of member enterprises in the supply chain environment. The specific research work is as follows: 1. Aiming at the situation that the market demand rate is influenced by the retail price and the length of warranty, the two-stage supply chain management is studied by using game theory. The competition mechanism is discussed by establishing mathematical models: (1) the manufacturer is the leader of Stackelberg, and (2) the retailer is the leader of Stackelberg. The manufacturer and retailer take the maximum profit per unit time as the goal to determine the warranty period and retail price respectively. For these two cases, the analytical solution or joint equation of the optimal product price and warranty period is obtained. 2. For a two-level supply chain consisting of a single supplier and two competing manufacturers, the supplier is the leader. The manufacturer is the follower, produces two alternative products, discusses the supplier unified batch price policy and the manufacturer guarantee period strategy. The game behavior among the members of the supply chain is studied by inverse order induction method. Firstly, the game behavior between two manufacturers is discussed, and the optimal reaction function of warranty period and the unique Nash equilibrium are obtained. Then, the batch price policy of suppliers is discussed, and the specific analytical expression is obtained. A numerical example is used to describe the strategy of supplier and manufacturer and the rule of change of profit per unit time in view of the difference between the two manufacturers is only a special case of different market size.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：渤海大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F224;F274

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本文編號(hào)：2216479