發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-04 11:23

  本文選題：農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司 + 公司治理�。� 參考：《中國海洋大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：任何企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)管理目標(biāo)都是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)值最大化，其途徑從根本上而言很大程度上取決于企業(yè)的投資行為，投資效率如何直接關(guān)系到企業(yè)能否實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)值最大化。這也是上市公司投資效率成為學(xué)者們關(guān)注的重要原因之一。隨著我國資本市場的不斷發(fā)展，上市公司出現(xiàn)了諸多低效率的投資行為，如盲目投資、資金嚴(yán)重閑置、資金被控股股東占用以及改變投資方向等。它們極大地影響了企業(yè)生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營能力以及利益相關(guān)者的切身利益。 農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司作為一種特殊的公司，承擔(dān)著國民經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重任，其基礎(chǔ)性的作用不言而喻，農(nóng)業(yè)的發(fā)展程度在某種意義上決定了我國現(xiàn)代化的水平。加快農(nóng)業(yè)的發(fā)展顯得尤為重要，而這離不開農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化組織的構(gòu)建和完善，離不開具有現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度特征的上市公司。農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司連接了農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)和資本市場，有助于推動農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化、提高農(nóng)業(yè)科技水平、促進(jìn)我國農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展。鑒于此，我國積極營造有利于農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司發(fā)展的政策。在此背景下，農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資行為引起學(xué)者們的關(guān)注。 為此，本文對我國農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的概況進(jìn)行初步分析，然后對效率投資模型進(jìn)行深入分析，并研究了對其有重要影響的兩個(gè)因素——負(fù)債和公司治理的角度進(jìn)行深入分析。研究得出如下結(jié)論： （1）農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的基本的情況進(jìn)行一些分析，在此基礎(chǔ)上對農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資效率進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，選取了2008—2010年期間的農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本，分析我國農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資效率，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，上市公司普遍存在著投資不足和過度投資，并進(jìn)一步分析了產(chǎn)生的原因。 （2）從委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論等理論出發(fā)分析負(fù)債對企業(yè)投資效率的影響，負(fù)債的存在一方面容易引起股東與債權(quán)人的沖突，而引起投資不足和資產(chǎn)替代行為的發(fā)生；另一方面又會對由股東—經(jīng)理人沖突、大股東一中小股東沖突等之間的沖突所引起的非效率投資行為有一定的相機(jī)治理作用。此外，不同期限以及不同類型的負(fù)債對企業(yè)投資行為的影響也不盡相同。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了債務(wù)融資對投資效率的影響，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，負(fù)債融資有助于提高投資效率，證明了負(fù)債具有較強(qiáng)的治理作用，進(jìn)一步的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，流動負(fù)債比長期負(fù)債所發(fā)揮的作用更為有效，銀行借款比商業(yè)信用的作用更為顯著。 （3）采用實(shí)證方法研究了農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的公司治理與投資效率之間的關(guān)系，結(jié)果表明，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會和外部治理環(huán)境都對投資效率產(chǎn)生一定的影響。第一大股東持股比例對非效率投資行為影響顯著，，隨著第一大股東持股比例的增加，能夠提高上市公司的投資效率，發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)持股比例增加到一定程度時(shí)，投資效率會受到抑制；股權(quán)制衡度對提高投資效率起到一定積極作用。董事會在提高投資效率方面也有一定的積極作用，兩權(quán)分置、獨(dú)立董事都能幫助上市公司提高投資效率，而董事會的規(guī)模對投資效率并沒有起到倒U型的關(guān)系；從公司治理的外部環(huán)境看，市場化指數(shù)的提高，政府干預(yù)程度的減少，法治水平的改善，都能對上市公司企業(yè)效率的提升有明顯的促進(jìn)作用。股權(quán)集中度有助于提升上市公司的投資效率，還沒有達(dá)到效率損失的拐點(diǎn)，股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制也能有效約束大股東的行為；就董事會治理而言，提高董事會戰(zhàn)略決策能力和強(qiáng)化獨(dú)立董事的獨(dú)立性更有助于提升企業(yè)的投資效率；兩職分離可以使董事長和總經(jīng)理合理分工、明確職責(zé)。減少和避免政府的不良干預(yù)有助于提高農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資效率，公司治理的外部環(huán)境改善，對企業(yè)的投資效率都有明顯的促進(jìn)作用。因此，急需建立健全一個(gè)相對公平透明和自由競爭的外部環(huán)境，這樣才能營造一個(gè)良好的氛圍，更加有利于提高企業(yè)的投資效率，實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展。 就其理論意義而言，農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司要想實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化，必須提高投資效率，只有這樣才能做大做強(qiáng)。如何提高投資效率呢？首先農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司應(yīng)當(dāng)優(yōu)化融資結(jié)構(gòu)，因?yàn)檫@為投資提供了資金來源，積極發(fā)揮這種資金來源的合理性以及治理作用。其次，優(yōu)化農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)，深入研究公司治理對投資效率的影響，而不僅僅從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)層次，需要從多方面加強(qiáng)公司治理，從而才能有效地提高投資效率，并為構(gòu)建有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)提供了科學(xué)的理論依據(jù)。針對當(dāng)前我國資本市場和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的實(shí)際情況，如何正確地引導(dǎo)企業(yè)進(jìn)行科學(xué)合理的投資，最大限度地運(yùn)用投資的資金，以及規(guī)范內(nèi)部人的投資行為等，這些都是至今在理論和實(shí)踐兩方面都沒有做出明確的答案。所以，本文的研究的理論意義：（1）針對我國資本市場不完善的實(shí)際情況，分析了農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司投資效率的特征；(2)研究了負(fù)債融資對農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資效率的影響；（3）系統(tǒng)分析了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司投資效率的影響，從多方面研究了投資效率的影響機(jī)制，從而積極推進(jìn)融資結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)投資的研究。 本文的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義在于：（1）針對當(dāng)前資本市場的實(shí)際情況，對提升農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資效率，有在一定程度上促進(jìn)的作用。同時(shí)也為農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化發(fā)展以及相關(guān)的政策制定提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)；（2）優(yōu)化農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司投資決策的公司治理機(jī)制和融資結(jié)構(gòu)，從而能夠?yàn)樘嵘�農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的價(jià)值提供了參考依據(jù)。 本文可能具有如下的創(chuàng)新：（1）對Richardson（2006）經(jīng)典的投資效率模型進(jìn)行了一定修訂，檢驗(yàn)了我國農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的投資效率，從而解決了一旦樣本數(shù)量較少時(shí)，如何使用該模型的問題。（2）本文對農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司投資效率的影響因素主要從負(fù)債和公司治理兩個(gè)角度綜合考慮，從而較為全面地考察對農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司非效率投資的影響，為實(shí)踐如何改進(jìn)非效率投資提供了一定理論支持和經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。 當(dāng)然：本文在研究農(nóng)業(yè)上市非效率投資時(shí)，未來還需要進(jìn)一步研究的地方： （1）未對過度投資和投資不足分別檢驗(yàn)，由于本文的樣本較少，導(dǎo)致分別研究后不滿足計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)回歸分析方法，為此，可以采用多年的數(shù)據(jù)來彌補(bǔ)這一缺陷。 （2）本文僅僅考慮了負(fù)債和公司治理兩方面的影響因素，如涉及到產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、經(jīng)理人等外部市場的相關(guān)情況等未考慮。
[Abstract]:The objective of any enterprise's financial management is to maximize the value of the enterprise. Its way is largely determined by the investment behavior of the enterprise. The efficiency of the investment is directly related to the maximization of the value of the enterprise. This is one of the important reasons for the investment efficiency of the listed companies to become the concern of the scholars. With the continuous development of this market, there are many inefficient investment behaviors of listed companies, such as blind investment, unused funds, funds being occupied by controlling shareholders and changing the direction of investment. They have greatly influenced the enterprise's production and operation ability and the vital interests of the stakeholders.
As a special kind of company, the agricultural listed company bears the responsibility of the national economic development. Its basic role is self-evident. The degree of agricultural development determines the level of our modernization in a sense. It is particularly important to speed up the development of agriculture, which is inseparable from the construction and improvement of the agricultural industrialization organization. Listed companies with the characteristics of modern enterprise system. Agricultural listed companies connect agricultural production and capital market, which will help promote agricultural industrialization, improve agricultural science and technology and promote the development of agricultural productivity in China. In view of this, China is actively creating a policy conducive to the development of agricultural listed companies. Under this background, agricultural listed companies The investment behavior has aroused the attention of the scholars.
Therefore, this paper makes a preliminary analysis on the general situation of China's agricultural listed companies, then analyzes the efficiency investment model deeply, and studies the two factors which have important impact on it - debt and corporate governance.
(1) the basic situation of the listed agricultural companies is analyzed. On this basis, the investment efficiency of the listed agricultural companies is empirically analyzed, and the agricultural listed companies in the period from 2008 to 2010 are selected as the research samples to analyze the investment efficiency of the listed companies in our country. Degree investment and further analysis of the causes.
(2) from the theory of principal-agent and the theory of information asymmetry, the influence of debt on the efficiency of investment is analyzed. The existence of liabilities is easy to cause the conflict between the shareholders and the creditor, which causes the lack of investment and the substitution behavior of the assets; on the other hand, it will be the conflict between the shareholders and managers, and the big shareholders and the small and medium shareholders. The inefficiency investment behavior caused by the conflict between them has a certain effect on the camera governance. In addition, the effects of different maturities and different types of liabilities on the investment behavior are different. The empirical test of the effect of debt financing on investment efficiency shows that debt financing helps to improve the investment efficiency and proves the debt. With stronger governance, further research has found that current liabilities are more effective than long-term liabilities, and bank loans are more significant than commercial credit.
(3) the empirical method is used to study the relationship between corporate governance and investment efficiency of a listed agricultural company. The results show that the ownership structure, the board of directors and the external governance environment have a certain impact on the investment efficiency. The proportion of the first large shareholders has a significant impact on the inefficiency investment behavior, with the increase of the proportion of the first large shareholders. It can improve the investment efficiency of listed companies and find that when the share ratio increases to a certain extent, the investment efficiency will be suppressed. The balance of equity plays a positive role in improving the efficiency of investment. The board of directors also has a positive role in improving the efficiency of investment. The two rights division, independent directors can help the listed companies to increase investment. The scale of the board of directors does not have an inverted U relationship with the efficiency of the investment. From the external environment of the corporate governance, the improvement of the market index, the reduction of government intervention and the improvement of the rule of law have an obvious promoting effect on the promotion of the efficiency of the listed companies. The concentration of equity is helpful to the promotion of listed companies. The investment efficiency has not reached the inflection point of the efficiency loss, and the equity balance mechanism can effectively restrain the behavior of the large shareholders. As for the board governance, improving the strategic decision-making ability of the board of directors and strengthening the independence of the independent directors will help to improve the investment efficiency of the enterprises; the separation of the two posts can make the chairman and the general manager a reasonable division of labor. Reducing and avoiding the government's bad intervention can help to improve the investment efficiency of the listed companies, improve the external environment of the corporate governance and promote the investment efficiency of the enterprises. Therefore, it is urgent to establish and improve a relatively fair and transparent and free competition external environment, in order to create a good one. The atmosphere is more conducive to improving the investment efficiency of enterprises and realizing the sustainable development of enterprises.
As far as its theoretical significance is concerned, the agricultural listed companies must improve their investment efficiency if they want to realize modernization. Only in this way can we improve the efficiency of investment. First, the agricultural listed companies should optimize the financing structure, because this provides a source of funds for the investment and exerts the rationality and governance of this source of funds. Secondly, we should optimize the governance structure of the listed companies, and deeply study the impact of corporate governance on investment efficiency, not only from the level of ownership structure, which need to strengthen corporate governance from many aspects, so as to effectively improve the investment efficiency and provide scientific theoretical basis for the construction of an effective corporate governance structure. The actual situation of the market and the corporate governance structure, how to correctly guide the enterprise to carry out scientific and rational investment, maximize the use of investment funds, and standardize the insider's investment behavior, all these are two aspects of the theory and practice have not made a clear answer. Therefore, the theoretical significance of this study: (1) In view of the actual situation of imperfect capital market in China, the characteristics of investment efficiency of agricultural listed companies are analyzed. (2) the influence of debt financing on the investment efficiency of agricultural listed companies is studied. (3) the influence of corporate governance structure on the investment efficiency of agricultural listed companies is systematically analyzed, and the influence mechanism of investment efficiency is studied from many aspects. In order to actively promote the research of financing structure, corporate governance structure and enterprise investment.
The practical significance of this paper is: (1) in view of the actual situation of the current capital market, it has the role of promoting the investment efficiency of the agricultural listed companies to a certain extent. At the same time, it also provides empirical evidence for the development of agricultural industrialization and related policy formulation; (2) the corporate governance mechanism of optimizing the investment decision of the agricultural listed companies. And financing structure, so as to provide reference for improving the value of agricultural listed companies.
This article may have the following innovations: (1) a certain revision of the Richardson (2006) classic investment efficiency model has been made to test the investment efficiency of the listed agricultural companies in China, thus solving the problem of how to use the model once the sample size is small. (2) the main factors affecting the investment efficiency of the agricultural listed companies are mainly negative. The two angles of debt and corporate governance are taken into consideration to comprehensively examine the impact on the inefficiency investment of the listed agricultural companies and provide some theoretical support and empirical evidence for the practice of improving the inefficiency investment.
Of course: in the future, we need further research in the study of inefficient investment in agriculture.
(1) there is no separate inspection of overinvestment and insufficient investment. Because the sample of this paper is less, the regression analysis method of econometrics is not satisfied after the study. For this reason, many years of data can be used to make up for this defect.
(2) this paper only considers the two factors of liabilities and corporate governance, such as the nature of property rights and the external market of managers.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F324;F832.51;F224

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