發(fā)布時間：2018-05-24 21:35

  本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 股利分配��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：股利政策是一個悠久且經(jīng)典的研究領(lǐng)域,也是截止現(xiàn)在仍然帶著一層神秘面紗的一個謎題。股利政策,或者說股利分配,盡管是一個老生常談的議題,但相關(guān)的研究卻源源不斷地為這一領(lǐng)域注入新的活力。從早期的股利無關(guān)論、信號傳遞理論、代理理論到后來的行為股利理論,研究視角不斷擴(kuò)展,使得這一領(lǐng)域的研究永遠(yuǎn)保持活力。目前難以用一個完整的框架將股利政策的所有研究囊括其中,股利分配主要的研究方向有股利是否影響公司價值、公司為什么要發(fā)放股利、股利水平的影響因素等。研究思路也呈現(xiàn)出百花齊放、百家爭鳴的景象,公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)、股利的市場反應(yīng)、管理層和投資者心態(tài)等這些因素均陸續(xù)被納入到股利政策的研究中。由于股利分配作為財務(wù)管理活動的最后一環(huán),理解股利政策其中的奧秘對于公司的治理有著很好的反饋作用。目前我國學(xué)者對于股利政策的研究都基于主板市場,目前尚無統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論可以完整剖析我國上市公司的各種“股利現(xiàn)象”。2009年,我國的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場在深圳證交所拉開帷幕。由于主板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板存在宏觀(制度)和微觀(公司特征)上的二重差異,因此兩個市場上市公司的股利分配也可能會呈現(xiàn)不同的模式,本文的研究目的就在于分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利分配現(xiàn)狀以及產(chǎn)生這種現(xiàn)象的原因。 鑒于對于主板市場股利政策的研究目前尚未達(dá)成共識,這意味著在對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利分配現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析時不能將思維局限在某一理論框架中。本文的分析思路是立足于實際情況,尋找可能能夠解釋該現(xiàn)象產(chǎn)生的原因,再將研究結(jié)果反饋到實踐,提出相關(guān)的建議。 本文的研究目的在于：第一,分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利分配現(xiàn)狀。第二,分析產(chǎn)生該現(xiàn)象的原因。第三,通過本文的分析為投資者決策提供參考。 本文主要的研究內(nèi)容包括股利分配現(xiàn)狀描述、理論和現(xiàn)實原因闡述和實證檢驗三大部分。在對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利分配現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行描述后,總結(jié)出其“高轉(zhuǎn)增”、“高派現(xiàn)”和“集中派現(xiàn)”三個特點。由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股本規(guī)模較小且資本公積充足,轉(zhuǎn)增行為無可非議,因此本文將研究重點放在“派現(xiàn)”上,這也是創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股利分配最吸引人眼球的地方。所謂的“高派現(xiàn)”并非絕對的,而是與主板上市公司進(jìn)行對比后的相對結(jié)果,本文認(rèn)為,主板上市公司的股利水平是一個合理的參照物,二者同處中國資本市場這一大環(huán)境下。而且,主板上市公司相對更為成熟理論上應(yīng)發(fā)放更多的現(xiàn)金股利實際卻不如創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司“大方”,更能體現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的“高派現(xiàn)”特征。 根據(jù)對國內(nèi)外關(guān)于股利政策研究的回顧和梳理,結(jié)合創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的實際情況,本文從對上市公司管理層即股利決策制定者的心理分析出發(fā),并同時考慮到上市公司自身特征,從而在一個較為完整的框架下展開分析。首先,以行為股利理論為切入點,將社會心理學(xué)運用到對股利分配的研究當(dāng)中,提出羊群行為和管理層套現(xiàn)動機(jī)兩個假設(shè)。羊群行為是指公司管理層在股利分配決策中的相互模仿。該理論既可以解釋創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的“集中派現(xiàn)”行為也可以用于解釋“高派現(xiàn)”。管理層套現(xiàn)動機(jī)則是基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司普遍存在管理層持股這一事實,由于高管所持的股份流通存在一定限制,面對創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的高市盈率卻無法兌現(xiàn)獲利,通過現(xiàn)金股利來獲取現(xiàn)金利益則順理成章。其次,從創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的基本面信息為根據(jù),提出超募資金回流和盈利持續(xù)能力兩個假說。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在工P0期間融得大量超募資金,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對于超募資金的使用有著嚴(yán)格的限制,當(dāng)資金閑置無處可去時,公司可能將募得的資金作為現(xiàn)金股利返還給股東。提出盈余持續(xù)能力假說則是因為股利產(chǎn)生的最終來源是公司的盈余,從盈余的角度去分析公司的股利分配既能檢驗分紅的合理性,也能考察這種分紅行為在未來是否可持續(xù)。 本文的實證結(jié)論為：(1)公司每股股利與行業(yè)內(nèi)其他公司的股利水平?jīng)]有顯著的相關(guān)性,羊群行為假設(shè)不成立。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層在決定公司股利水平時并沒有跟風(fēng)行業(yè)內(nèi)其他公司,說明市場的“集中高派現(xiàn)”現(xiàn)象并非由管理層的非理性因素導(dǎo)致。(2)公司每股股利與管理層持股比例正相關(guān),管理層套現(xiàn)假設(shè)得到驗證。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市管理層確有通過發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利從公司套取現(xiàn)金的嫌疑,但這種“套現(xiàn)”經(jīng)后文的檢驗后并不損害公司的盈利能力,因此不能把管理層的套現(xiàn)動機(jī)視為一種非理性傾向。(3)公司每股股利與融資性凈現(xiàn)金流成正比,超募資金回流假設(shè)得到驗證。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司現(xiàn)金股利其中一個來源是閑置的超募資金。盡管創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司被貼上了“高成長性”的標(biāo)簽,但實際的投資機(jī)會并不一定可觀,超募資金作為現(xiàn)金股利回流到投資者手中,可能表明創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司暫時沒有良好的投資機(jī)會或者是對超募資金的運營存在一定問題。(4)公司每股股利與扣除非經(jīng)常損益后的每股收益成正比且公司的每股收益具有一階自相關(guān)性,盈利持續(xù)能力假設(shè)得到驗證。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司很可能是在借股利向投資者傳遞公司未來發(fā)展和盈利能力的信息。盡管數(shù)據(jù)的限制使得我們無法對股利是否能傳遞有關(guān)公司未來盈余狀況的信息進(jìn)行驗證,但由于我們相信特定一家公司的盈余持續(xù)能力在短期內(nèi)不會改變,因此我們可以根據(jù)對歷史數(shù)據(jù)的檢驗推出在未來盈余依然具有一定的持續(xù)性。 本文的研究結(jié)論認(rèn)為,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的“集中派現(xiàn)”和“高派現(xiàn)”行為主要是公司具有的持續(xù)盈利能力所致,非理性因素?fù)诫s較少。當(dāng)公司預(yù)計未來可以保持增長勢頭的情況下,將公司創(chuàng)造的現(xiàn)金用于回報股東是理所當(dāng)然的,但與此同時,由現(xiàn)金股利所反映出的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司可能存在的投資瓶頸問題也值得關(guān)注。根據(jù)研究結(jié)論,提出兩點建議：(1)合理規(guī)劃和使用超募資金。作為尚未步入成熟期的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司,未來潛在的大量投資機(jī)會要求公司將超募資金留存并對其進(jìn)行合理的規(guī)劃和投放,不應(yīng)因為暫時的投資瓶頸而將資金返回給投資者,而應(yīng)運用超募資金為公司創(chuàng)造投資機(jī)會(比如進(jìn)行研發(fā)、合作等)。同時監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也應(yīng)在“引導(dǎo)”層面進(jìn)一步去解決超募資金所帶來的問題,而非停留在“要求披露”層面上。(2)嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的股票流通。盡管公司管理層通過現(xiàn)金股利套現(xiàn)的動機(jī)并不影響公司的盈利能力,但這并不能排除依然存在一些持股管理人員抱有短期獲利心理,尤其是面對市場如此高的市盈率而無法與之沾邊。因此,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)在保持創(chuàng)業(yè)板股票活力的同時配合相關(guān)措施使股票的波動控制在合理的風(fēng)險范圍內(nèi),緩解管理層由于無法在高股價的情況進(jìn)行變現(xiàn)便轉(zhuǎn)向上市公司內(nèi)部進(jìn)行套現(xiàn)的心理,也可以從軟性氛圍入手,培養(yǎng)投資者的長期投資意識。 本文的預(yù)期貢獻(xiàn)是：(1)結(jié)合行為財務(wù)的研究視角,同時考慮到上市公司的實際情況,克服了以往研究從單一角度研究問題的缺陷。(2)首次系統(tǒng)研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利分配行為,為股利研究開辟了新領(lǐng)域。(3)對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股利分配的剖析可以深入理解公司治理和發(fā)展方面的問題以及管理層的心理行為,從而為完善公司的治理和發(fā)展提供相關(guān)建議,通過對股利分配這一行為的解讀,也能為創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的投資者提供關(guān)于股利現(xiàn)象的合理性的依據(jù)。 本文研究的局限性在于：(1)創(chuàng)業(yè)板設(shè)立時間不足三年,因此本文研究所采用的數(shù)據(jù)只有2009和2010年兩年,樣本量不夠大可能會使得研究結(jié)論的準(zhǔn)確性有所下降。(2)在研究管理層動機(jī)時,本文只考慮了他們的羊群行為傾向和套現(xiàn)動機(jī),然而目前關(guān)于討論管理者行為因素對股利政策的影響的文獻(xiàn)中還涵蓋了比如管理者過度自信等更多的研究視角,本文并未建立一個完整的框架來盡可能將管理者心理和行為方方面面的因素囊括其中。(3)本文只能證實股利的確作為信號傳遞了公司盈利方面的信息,股利越高說明了公司截止當(dāng)期的盈余持續(xù)性越高,但對于股利是否能反應(yīng)未來盈余的持續(xù)性尚不能驗證。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy is a long and classic field of research, and it is still a mystery that still has a mysterious veil. Dividend policy, or dividend distribution, is an old topic, but the related research has inject new vitality into this field. From the early dividend unrelated theory, signal transmission The theory, the agency theory and the later behavior dividend theory, the research perspective continues to expand, making the research in this field always alive. It is difficult to cover all the studies of dividend policy with a complete framework. The main research direction of dividend distribution is whether dividends affect the company value, and why the company pays dividends, The factors such as the influencing factors of the dividend level, and so on. The research ideas also show a hundred flowers blossom, a hundred schools of view, the corporate governance structure, the dividend market reaction, the management level and the investor mentality are all included in the dividend policy research. As the dividend distribution is the last ring of the financial management activities, the dividend policy is understood. The mystery of them has a good feedback effect on the corporate governance. At present, the research on dividend policy in China is based on the main board market. At present, there is no unified conclusion that can fully analyze the "dividend phenomenon" of Listed Companies in China for.2009 years. The GEM market in China opens in Shenzhen stock exchange. And there is a double difference between the macro (institutional) and microcosmic (corporate characteristics) of the gem, so the dividend distribution of the two listed companies may also present different models. The purpose of this study is to analyze the current situation of dividend distribution in the GEM listed companies and the reasons for this phenomenon.
In view of the lack of consensus on the dividend policy of the main board market, it means that the thinking can not be limited to a theoretical framework when analyzing the current situation of dividend distribution of the GEM listed companies. The analysis of this paper is based on the actual situation, looking for the possible explanation of the causes of the phenomenon, and then the research will be studied. The result is feedback to practice and relevant suggestions are put forward.
The purpose of this study is: first, analyze the current situation of dividend distribution of the GEM listed companies. Second, analyze the causes of the phenomenon. Third, through the analysis of this paper to provide reference for investor decision-making.
The main research contents of this paper include the description of current dividend distribution, theoretical and practical reasons and empirical testing three parts. After describing the current situation of dividend distribution of the GEM listed companies, it summarizes the three characteristics of "high transfer", "high school cash" and "centralized cash". In this paper, the focus of the study on the dividend distribution is the most attractive place for the dividend distribution of the GEM listed companies. The so-called "high school cash" is not absolute, but the relative results compared with the main board listed companies. This article believes that the main board listed companies are listed. The dividend level is a reasonable reference, and the two are in the same environment as China's capital market. Moreover, the listed companies of the main board should pay more cash dividends in theory than the "generous" of the GEM listed companies and reflect the "high school cash" characteristics of the GEM market.
According to the review and combing of the research on dividend policy both at home and abroad, combining the actual situation of the GEM listed companies, this paper starts with the psychological analysis of the listed company management, that is, the dividend policymaker, and takes into account the characteristics of the listed company at the same time, so as to analyze it in a more complete framework. First, behavior stock. The theory of profit is the breakthrough point. It applies social psychology to the study of dividend distribution, and puts forward two hypotheses: herd behavior and management level motivation. The herd behavior refers to the mutual imitation of the corporate management in the dividend distribution decision. The management level incentive is based on the fact that there is a general management shareholding in the GEM listed companies. Because there are some restrictions on the stock circulation held by the executives, the high earnings ratio of the gem is not profitable, and the cash benefit is reasonable by cash dividend. Secondly, from the gem. Based on the basic information of the listed companies, two hypotheses are put forward for the reflux of excess funds and the ability to sustain profits. The listed companies of the listed companies have a large amount of excess funds during the period of P0, and the regulatory agencies have strict restrictions on the use of super funds. When the funds are idle and there is no place to go, the company may raise funds as cash dividends. The hypothesis of earnings sustainability hypothesis is that the ultimate source of the dividend production is the company's surplus. The analysis of the dividend distribution from the perspective of earnings not only can test the rationality of the dividend distribution, but also can examine whether the dividend behavior is sustainable in the future.
The empirical conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there is no significant correlation between the dividend per share of the company and the dividend level of other companies in the industry. The hypothesis of herding behavior is not established. The management layer of the GEM listed company does not follow the other companies in the company's dividend level. It shows that the "centralized high cash" phenomenon of the market is not the management level. The non rational factors lead to. (2) the dividend per share of the company is positively related to the proportion of the managerial ownership, and the management level is verified. The management layer of the gem does have the suspicion of cash withdrawal from the company by issuing cash dividends, but this "arbitrage" does not damage the company's profitability after the test. Therefore, it can not manage the management layer. The arbitrage motivation is regarded as a non rational tendency. (3) the dividend per share of the company is proportional to the net cash flow of the financing, and the hypothesis of the backflow backflow is verified. The cash dividend of the GEM listed company is one of the unused excess funds. Although the GEM listed companies are labeled with "high growth", the actual investment machine It may not be considerable, as the cash dividend returns to the investor in the hands of the cash dividend, it may indicate that the GEM listed companies have no good investment opportunities for the time being or have some problems with the operation of the excess funds. (4) the dividend per share of the company is proportional to the earnings per share after deducting non regular profit and loss and the earnings of the company are per share. The first order autocorrelation, the assumption of profitability sustainability is verified. The GEM listed companies are likely to be the information to transfer the future development and profitability of the company to the investor. Although the data restrictions make it impossible for us to verify whether the dividend can pass on the information about the future earnings of the company, but we believe that The sustainability of a particular company will not change in the short term, so we can prove that the future surplus still has a certain sustainability based on the test of historical data.
The conclusion of this paper is that the "centralism" and "high cash" behavior of the GEM listed companies are mainly caused by the company's sustained profitability, and the irrational factors are less doped. When the company expects to maintain the momentum of growth in the future, it is of course to use the company's cash for return to shareholders, but it is the same as this. At the same time, the potential investment bottlenecks of the GEM listed companies, reflected by cash dividends, are also worth paying attention to. According to the conclusions of the study, two suggestions are put forward: (1) rational planning and use of super fund. As a GEM listed company that has not entered the mature period, the future potential of a large number of investment opportunities will require the company to reserve funds. It should not be returned to investors because of the temporary investment bottleneck, but should be used to create investment opportunities for the company (such as R & D, cooperation, etc.). On the level of "request disclosure". (2) strictly supervise the circulation of stock market in the gem. Although the motivation of corporate management through cash dividend does not affect the profitability of the company, it does not exclude that some managers still have short-term profit psychology, especially in the face of such high market earnings ratio. Therefore, the regulatory agency should keep the volatility of the stock in a reasonable risk range with relevant measures while keeping the vitality of the gem stock. Long term investment awareness.
The expected contributions of this paper are: (1) combining the research perspective of behavioral finance and taking into account the actual situation of listed companies, it overcomes the shortcomings of the previous research from a single angle. (2) the first systematic study of the dividend distribution behavior of the listed companies of the gem has opened up a new field for the research of the dividend study. (3) the dividend of the GEM listed companies. The analysis can deeply understand the problems of corporate governance and development and the psychological behavior of management, so as to provide relevant suggestions for the improvement of corporate governance and development. Through the interpretation of the dividend distribution, it can also provide the rationalization for investors in the GEM market.
The limitations of this study are as follows: (1) the setting time of the gem is less than three years, so the data used in this study are only in 2009 and 2010, and the lack of sample size may reduce the accuracy of the research conclusions. (2) in the study of management motivation, this paper only considers their herd behavior tendency and the motivation of cash. At present, the literature on the influence of managers' behavior factors on dividend policy also covers more research perspectives such as overconfidence of managers. This paper does not establish a complete framework to include the factors of managers' psychological and behavioral aspects as much as possible. (3) this paper can only prove that dividends do serve as a signal. The higher the dividend information of the company, the higher the dividend is, the higher the earnings persistence of the company's cut-off period, but it can not be verified whether the dividend can reflect the sustainability of the future earnings.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F233;F224

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