發(fā)布時間：2018-10-18 19:55

【摘要】：近年來，小微企業(yè)在我國所占有的經(jīng)濟地位越來越重要，但是小微企業(yè)融資難卻一直是制約企業(yè)發(fā)展的瓶頸，我國各級政府、金融機構(gòu)、學(xué)術(shù)界對破解小微企業(yè)融資困難的問題做了諸多的努力，雖然小有成效但是與數(shù)量眾多的小微企業(yè)的巨額融資缺口相比卻顯得微不足道。自從1976年孟加拉國提出聯(lián)保貸款模式以來，這種模式在世界范圍內(nèi)得到了廣泛的推廣，許多國家還將這種聯(lián)保模式運用到了解決中小企業(yè)融資問題上。1999年聯(lián)保貸款模式開始進入我國并迅速發(fā)展，從2011年“小微企業(yè)”這個概念被提出以后，許多銀行還針對性地提出了“小微企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款”，，總的來說聯(lián)保貸款模式對我國小微企業(yè)融資問題的解決起到了促進作用，但是進入2013年以后，聯(lián)保貸款卻成了不良貸款的重災(zāi)區(qū)，聯(lián)保貸款違約問題引發(fā)了廣泛的關(guān)注。如何提高聯(lián)保貸款的還款率便成了當(dāng)前開展小微企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款業(yè)務(wù)中一個亟待解決的問題。 正是基于這樣一種思考，本文對我國小微企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款還款激勵機制的有效性進行了研究�，F(xiàn)有的研究通常是通過某個地區(qū)具體的案例或者使用博弈論分析法研究還款激勵的因素或機制。本文將這兩種研究方法結(jié)合在一起，首先進行博弈論分析，通過比較提出由“連帶責(zé)任”、“社會懲罰”、“動態(tài)激勵”三者構(gòu)成的還款激勵機制是最有效的。再根據(jù)對廣州地區(qū)470家小微企業(yè)的問卷調(diào)查結(jié)果對構(gòu)成還款激勵機制的因素進行實證檢驗并驗證了還款激勵機制的有效性。最后根據(jù)本文的研究結(jié)論對銀行、小微企業(yè)、提出了幾點切實可行的建議，旨在促進小微企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款在我國的健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the economic status of small and micro enterprises in our country has become more and more important, but the financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises have been the bottleneck restricting the development of enterprises. Academic circles have made a lot of efforts to solve the problem of financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises. Although small and effective, compared with a large number of small and micro enterprises, the huge financing gap is insignificant. Since Bangladesh introduced the UNPROFOR loan model in 1976, it has been widely promoted worldwide. Many countries have also applied this model to solve the problem of financing SMEs. In 1999, the UNPROFOR loan model began to enter China and developed rapidly, since the concept of "small and micro enterprises" was put forward in 2011, Many banks have also put forward "small and microenterprise UNPROFOR loans". In general, the UNPROFOR loan model has contributed to the solution of the financing problem of small and micro enterprises in China, but after 2013, But the UNPROFOR loan has become the disaster area of the bad loan, the problem of the default of the UNPROFOR loan has aroused widespread concern. How to improve the repayment rate of UNPROFOR loan has become an urgent problem to be solved in the development of small and micro enterprise UNPROFOR loan business. Based on this thinking, this paper studies the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism for small and micro enterprises to repay UNPROFOR loans. Current studies are usually based on specific case studies or game theory analysis to study the factors or mechanisms of repayment incentives. In this paper, the two research methods are combined. First, the game theory analysis is carried out, and the repayment incentive mechanism composed of "joint and several liability", "social punishment" and "dynamic incentive" is put forward by comparison. Based on the questionnaire survey of 470 small and micro enterprises in Guangzhou, this paper makes an empirical test on the factors that constitute the repayment incentive mechanism and verifies the effectiveness of the repayment incentive mechanism. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, some practical suggestions are put forward for the banks and small and micro enterprises, in order to promote the healthy development of the small and micro enterprises' UNPROFOR loan in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.3;F832.4

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