發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-07 11:22

  本文選題：信任品　切入點(diǎn)：農(nóng)產(chǎn)品　出處：《江南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：信任屬性是指消費(fèi)者無(wú)論是在購(gòu)買(mǎi)前,還是購(gòu)買(mǎi)后都無(wú)法確切知道產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的一種產(chǎn)品特性。農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的健康安全特性具備明顯的信任屬性,作為信任品的一種,農(nóng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)上存在的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)問(wèn)題尤為嚴(yán)重。認(rèn)證制度作為一種有效的信號(hào)傳遞機(jī)制,在解決農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商和消費(fèi)者二者之間的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)問(wèn)題上,扮演著重要的角色。但是,在實(shí)際的生活中,認(rèn)證市場(chǎng)上充斥著違規(guī)認(rèn)證和合謀認(rèn)證現(xiàn)象,認(rèn)證農(nóng)產(chǎn)品頻頻爆出質(zhì)量安全事故。農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全關(guān)乎每一位公眾的切身利益,近年來(lái),國(guó)內(nèi)外的專(zhuān)家學(xué)者對(duì)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品認(rèn)證市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行一系列研究,本文基于認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)存在違規(guī)認(rèn)證和合謀認(rèn)證行為的現(xiàn)實(shí)問(wèn)題,對(duì)以下問(wèn)題開(kāi)展研究:認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)的違規(guī)認(rèn)證行為以及合謀認(rèn)證行為產(chǎn)生的原因是什么?認(rèn)證制度如何才能有效制約農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商的投機(jī)主義行為?在認(rèn)證制度失效的情況下,引進(jìn)政府規(guī)制政策是否能夠有效地改善市場(chǎng)失靈現(xiàn)象?規(guī)制有效的市場(chǎng)條件是什么?本文針對(duì)認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)存在違規(guī)認(rèn)證和合謀認(rèn)證的現(xiàn)實(shí),一方面通過(guò)構(gòu)建演化博弈模型,分析認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)的認(rèn)證選擇影響農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商生產(chǎn)行為的機(jī)理;另一方面將政府規(guī)制手段引入認(rèn)證市場(chǎng),探討政府補(bǔ)貼和罰款兩種政策手段在改善認(rèn)證市場(chǎng)失靈過(guò)程中的適用條件以及作用機(jī)理。研究得到以下管理啟示:(1)當(dāng)偽劣農(nóng)產(chǎn)品認(rèn)證花費(fèi)的偽裝成本相對(duì)較高時(shí),在政府不干預(yù)的情況下,即使認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)選擇違規(guī)認(rèn)證,農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商也會(huì)選擇生產(chǎn)合格產(chǎn)品,但是如果偽裝成本較低,即使認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)嚴(yán)格認(rèn)證,認(rèn)證制度無(wú)法起到制約農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的作用;(2)要確保市場(chǎng)上的認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)合法履職,必須降低認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)的認(rèn)證成本,保證認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利。同時(shí),認(rèn)證制度要想起到制約農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的作用,必須輔助相關(guān)的規(guī)制措施,加大農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商的期望損失,規(guī)避農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商投機(jī)行為。(3)在存在自愿性認(rèn)證制度的基礎(chǔ)上,無(wú)論認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)存在違規(guī)認(rèn)證行為,還是合謀認(rèn)證行為,政府通過(guò)進(jìn)一步設(shè)立針對(duì)偽劣農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商(合格農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商)的罰款政策(補(bǔ)貼政策),當(dāng)罰款額度(補(bǔ)貼額度)處于一個(gè)合理的范圍內(nèi)時(shí),市場(chǎng)上所有的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商都會(huì)選擇生產(chǎn)合格農(nóng)產(chǎn)品。本文的研究旨在為政府在治理認(rèn)證市場(chǎng)失效問(wèn)題中提供有益的決策參考,從而有效地防范認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)的違規(guī)認(rèn)證和合謀認(rèn)證行為,實(shí)現(xiàn)我國(guó)認(rèn)證市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展與完善,避免農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商提供偽劣農(nóng)產(chǎn)品,最終保障消費(fèi)者的健康安全。
[Abstract]:Trust attribute is a kind of product characteristic that consumers can not know exactly the product quality before or after purchase. The health and safety characteristics of agricultural products have obvious trust attribute, as one kind of trust products. The problem of information asymmetry in agricultural products market is especially serious. As an effective signal transmission mechanism, authentication system solves the problem of information asymmetry between agricultural product suppliers and consumers. However, in the actual life, the certification market is full of illegal certification and collusion certification phenomenon, certified agricultural products frequently burst out quality and safety accidents. The quality and safety of agricultural products is of vital interest to every public. In recent years, experts and scholars at home and abroad have carried out a series of studies in the field of agricultural product certification market. Conduct research on the following questions: what are the reasons for the illegal certification of certification bodies and the collusion certification behavior? How can the certification system effectively restrict the speculative behavior of agricultural product suppliers? In the case of the failure of the certification system, can the introduction of government regulation policies effectively improve the market failure? What are the market conditions for effective regulation? This paper aims at the reality that certification organization exists illegal certification and collusion certification. On the one hand, by constructing evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the mechanism that certification selection of certification body affects the production behavior of agricultural product suppliers. On the other hand, it introduces the means of government regulation into the certification market. This paper discusses the applicable conditions and mechanism of government subsidies and fines in the process of improving the failure of certification market. The following management enlightenment is obtained: 1) when the cost of fake and inferior agricultural products certification is relatively high, In the case of non-intervention by the government, even if the certification body chooses the illegal certification, the agricultural product supplier will also choose to produce qualified products, but if the camouflage cost is lower, even if the certification body strictly authenticates, In order to ensure the legitimate performance of certification bodies in the market, it is necessary to reduce the certification costs of certification bodies and ensure that the certification bodies are profitable. At the same time, In order to think of the role of certification system in restricting the opportunistic behavior of agricultural product suppliers, it is necessary to supplement relevant regulatory measures and increase the expected losses of agricultural product suppliers. On the basis of the existence of voluntary certification system, regardless of whether the certification body has illegal certification behavior or collusion certification behavior, Through the further establishment of a fine policy (subsidy policy) for suppliers of fake and inferior agricultural products (qualified agricultural product suppliers), when the amount of fines (subsidies) is within a reasonable range, All agricultural products suppliers in the market will choose to produce qualified agricultural products. The purpose of this study is to provide a useful decision reference for the government in the governance of certification market failures. Therefore, it can effectively prevent the illegal certification and collusive certification of the certification agencies, realize the development and perfection of the certification market in China, avoid the supply of fake and inferior agricultural products by agricultural product suppliers, and finally ensure the health and safety of consumers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F302.2;F307

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