發(fā)布時間：2016-03-17 11:19

本文認為等效認可的商品和在適用WTO協(xié)議和規(guī)定的范圍內(nèi)的服務(wù)。等效的討論源于加拿大中歐全面貿(mào)易協(xié)定（CETA）所提交的某些元素，其中具有完善的監(jiān)管制度經(jīng)濟發(fā)達地區(qū)可以選擇使用等效手段來進一步監(jiān)管合作。等效認可的世界貿(mào)易組織的有條件開放性可能是這些成員設(shè)計一個系統(tǒng)，同時也承認對方的國內(nèi)法規(guī)，可能提供列入其他WTO成員的更多的可能性的機會。This article considers equivalency recognition for goods and for services in the context of the applicable WTO agreements and provisions. The discussion of equivalency arises from certain elements presented by the Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA), in which economically developed territories with well-established regulatory systems might choose to use equivalency instruments to further regulatory cooperation. The conditionally open character of equivalency recognition in the WTO may be an opportunity for these members to design a system that, while recognizing each other’s domestic regulations, might offer additional possibilities for the inclusion of otherWTO members.

1 INTRODUCTION: DOMESTIC REGULATION IN PREFERENTIALTRADE AGREEMENTS1引言：國內(nèi)調(diào)控的優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易協(xié)定

國內(nèi)監(jiān)管問題的區(qū)域性優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易待遇協(xié)議（家長教師會）是人們關(guān)注的地區(qū)主義的討論的中心。無論是正在討論的條款是WTO Plus或WTO額外，2大多數(shù)文獻現(xiàn)在文檔PTA的成員正在尋求，在許多情況下，發(fā)現(xiàn)超出現(xiàn)有的WTO framework.3的感知局限性合作的新方法的事實十年之久的多哈回合談判尚無定論，建議的致病因素。但是，人們也可以斷定，theWTO協(xié)議的多邊基礎(chǔ)提供了可靠的法律基礎(chǔ)賴以PTA會員可以使用新技術(shù)實驗解決監(jiān)管issues.Whatever的原因，大多數(shù)，，如果不是全部，在全球經(jīng)濟中的大玩家 - 發(fā)達國家和發(fā)展中國家 - 都在積極產(chǎn)生新一代的“監(jiān)管”家長教師會。如果有一個共同的主題，以這些協(xié)議，這是它們裝載有處理國內(nèi)法規(guī)科目的規(guī)定，一些密切相關(guān)的自由化對商品和服務(wù)的非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘的核心業(yè)務(wù)，而其他監(jiān)管環(huán)境擴展到新的領(lǐng)域。一些科目，比如競爭政策和投資，都曾經(jīng)在theWTO多哈回合談判的積極議程。The treatment of domestic regulation issues in regional preferential trade agreements1 (PTAs) is at the centre of attention in the regionalism discussion.Whether the provisions being discussed are WTO Plus or WTO Extra,2 most of the literature now documents the fact that PTA members are seeking and, in many cases, finding new methods of cooperation that extend beyond the perceived limitations of the existing WTO framework.3 The inconclusiveness of the decade-long Doha Round is suggested as a causal factor. However, one can also posit that the multilateral underpinnings of theWTO agreement provide a secure legal base upon which PTA members can experiment with new techniques for addressing regulatory issues.Whatever the cause, most, if not all, of the large players in the global economy – developed and developing countries – are actively generating a new generation of ‘regulatory’ PTAs. If there is a common theme to these agreements, it is that they are loaded with provisions dealing with domestic regulation subjects, some closely tied to the core business of liberalizing non tariff barriers for trade in goods and services, while others extend the regulatory environment to new areas. Some of these subjects, like competition policy and investment,were once on the active agenda of theWTO Doha Round.
Most of the new agreements are ‘north-south’ arrangements between a developed and developing WTO Member. A regulatory pattern of sorts is discernable for these where the preferential trade concessions and more secure market access granted by the developed partner are matched with the regulatory undertakings on the part of the developing partner.As indicated in the 2011WTO Report, north-south PTAs tend to have more binding provisions in WTO-Plus subjects than do those between territories with similar levels of income. These agreements also have more WTO-Extra types of provisions, but only four of the subject areas, competition policy, intellectual property rights, investment and movement of capital tend to be set into binding legal regimes.4 These subject areas are also noted for their importance in supporting global production networks for goods, services, and investment.5 As far as ‘cooperation’ is concerned, these agreements have a tendency to be viewed as ‘rule giver’ versus ‘rule taker’, where existing regulatory regimes of the developed territory are extended to the developing member. As such, some of the PTA examples evidence a kind of regulatory premonition of a developed country global regulatory agenda – a world where intellectual property protection has more coverage and muscle than theWorld Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties underlying the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, where competition policy reform and undermining market access, and where investment protection rules can be brought out from stand-alone bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and institutionalized in a larger free movement framework.6 That so little of this regulatory activity has remained on the WTO negotiation agenda may be a remaining testament to the

 fear held by developing countries of any of these subject areas being linked to the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.Whatever the case, the contrast between what occurs commonly now in PTAs as compared to theWTO is stark.What has been soundly rejected in the WTO continues to be willingly undertaken in strategic PTAs between developed and developing territories.

2 WHAT DO PTAS BETWEEN DEVELOPEDTERRITORIES BRING TO THE PARTY?
3 EQUIVALENCY RECOGNITION FOR GOODS
3.1 THE MUTUALLY FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE WITH MUTUAL RECOGNITION
3.2 THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK: EQUIVALENCE RECOGNITION FOR PRODUCT AND FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS
3.3 REGIONAL EXCEPTION CONSIDERATIONS: FREE TRADE AREAS AND CUSTOMS UNIONS
4 EQUIVALENCY RECOGNITION FOR SERVICES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS
4.1 MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR QUALIFICATIONS, LICENSES, AND CERTIFICATIONS
4.2 REGIONAL EXCEPTION CONSIDERATIONS: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS
5 SUPPORTIVE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION
5.1 HOW DOES MFN RELATE TO INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION?

6 CONCLUSION總結(jié)

This raises a final consideration that is not so directed to the MFN issue but flows as an implication from it going to the systemic implications of bilateral recognition. There is an increasing panoply of institutional processes and transparency approaches being tried. This will continue to increase. A resource issue emerges for even larger territory regulatory systems, asking how many inter-regulatory agencies and committee systems, whether similar or dissimilar,
 public and/or private, can reasonably be established and maintained on an ongoing basis. Are there limits as to how may trading partners can be successfully taken on in this intensive cooperative manner?
This suggests a final point that has gradually emerged throughout this
 discussion. There is an implicit reading to the WTO provisions that appears to accord a plurilateral way forward for higher level recognition and its relation to the multilateral trading system. If an approach is being found to work via the bilateral instruments of notification and regulatory working groups, then it may be a mutual benefit to both those existing PTA members and other WTO Members to open the party. In the CETA context, this might particularly be beneficial. Both
 territories each maintain their own somewhat intensive and dynamic approaches
 with the US on regulatory cooperation issues, covering many of the subjects
 discussed here. It is well understood that the NAFTA approach has been refined over time and that it also varies somewhat from the approach adopted externally by the EU. It may not be realistic to suggest that a more open plurilateral construction be sought to attempt to integrate these separate bilateral processes. However, it may well be that such a bridge is worth seeking.

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