發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-23 10:14

  本文選題：兩權(quán)分離　切入點(diǎn)：外部治理環(huán)境　出處：《浙江農(nóng)林大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)正處于農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展的轉(zhuǎn)化階段和市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)型階段,農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司大多存在著終極控制人通過(guò)金字塔型控股的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),股東與管理者之間的代理沖突已被終極控股股東與中小股東之間的代理沖突取代成為農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司收益分配問(wèn)題中的首要矛盾。同時(shí),“法與金融”學(xué)派將研究的焦點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到外部治理環(huán)境,國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者分別從國(guó)家和地區(qū)的角度研究外部治理環(huán)境差異對(duì)公司股利政策的影響。然而,大多學(xué)者在研究中僅考察外部治理環(huán)境的直接效應(yīng),忽略了終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的兩權(quán)分離與外部治理環(huán)境交互作用對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司股利政策產(chǎn)生的影響。本文從雙重視角來(lái)研究終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與外部治理環(huán)境的交互作用對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司股利政策的影響。本文以2010-2014年間我國(guó)滬深股市A股主板上市的55家農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司作為初始研究對(duì)象,基于終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的視角,研究中引入外部治理環(huán)境,從宏觀和微觀兩個(gè)層面研究對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司現(xiàn)金股利政策的影響,并通過(guò)引入交叉項(xiàng),來(lái)考察外部治理環(huán)境能否緩解終極控股股東兩權(quán)分離對(duì)現(xiàn)金股利支付意愿和水平的負(fù)向影響,從一個(gè)立體的視角來(lái)研究現(xiàn)金股利政策。本文的研究結(jié)果主要包括:(1)內(nèi)部終極所有權(quán)層面,終極控股股東兩權(quán)分離對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的現(xiàn)金股利政策具有負(fù)向影響,現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與控制權(quán)的兩權(quán)分離程度越高,越能降低現(xiàn)金股利的支付意愿和支付水平;外部治理環(huán)境層面,外部治理環(huán)境與現(xiàn)金股利政策正相關(guān),即外部治理環(huán)境越好,農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司現(xiàn)金股利支付的意愿和水平越高。(2)外部治理環(huán)境的改善有助于緩解終極控股股東兩權(quán)分離對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司現(xiàn)金股利支付意愿的負(fù)向影響,而兩者的交叉項(xiàng)與現(xiàn)金股利支付水平之間沒(méi)有顯著的相關(guān)性,即外部治理環(huán)境的改善能有效地抑制終極控股股東為謀取私利而侵害中小股東權(quán)力的行為,提高現(xiàn)金股利支付意愿。
[Abstract]:China is in the transformation stage of agricultural development and market economy. Most of the agricultural listed companies have the ownership structure of ultimate controller through pyramid holding. The agency conflict between shareholders and managers has been replaced by the agency conflict between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders. At the same time, the "law and finance" school will study. The focus shifts to the external governance environment, Scholars at home and abroad have studied the influence of external governance environment differences on corporate dividend policy from national and regional perspectives. However, most scholars only examine the direct effects of external governance environment in the research. The influence of the interaction between the two ownership structure and the external governance environment on the dividend policy of agricultural listed companies is ignored. This paper studies the interaction between the ultimate ownership structure and the external governance environment from a dual perspective. This paper takes 55 agricultural listed companies listed on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2010-2014 as the initial research object. Based on the perspective of the ultimate ownership structure, the paper introduces the external governance environment to study the impact on the cash dividend policy of agricultural listed companies from the macro and micro levels, and through the introduction of cross-items. To investigate whether the external governance environment can alleviate the negative impact of the separation of the two rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder on the willingness and level of cash dividend payment, This paper studies cash dividend policy from a stereoscopic perspective. The results of this paper mainly include: 1) Internal ultimate ownership. The separation of two rights of ultimate controlling shareholder has a negative impact on the cash dividend policy of agricultural listed companies. The higher the degree of separation between cash flow right and control right is, the lower the willingness to pay and payment level of cash dividend is, and the more positive correlation is between external governance environment and cash dividend policy, that is, the better the external governance environment is, the better the external governance environment is. The higher the willingness and level of cash dividend payment of agricultural listed companies, the better the external governance environment can help to alleviate the negative impact of the separation of two rights of ultimate controlling shareholders on the willingness to pay cash dividends of agricultural listed companies. However, there is no significant correlation between the cross-items and the level of cash dividend payment, that is, the improvement of external governance environment can effectively restrain the ultimate controlling shareholders from infringing on the rights of minority shareholders in order to obtain private profits. Increase the willingness to pay cash dividends.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江農(nóng)林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F324;F302.6;F271

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本文編號(hào)：1653009