發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-03 08:00

  本文選題：商品糧供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：利益補(bǔ)償　出處：《黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：糧食安全問題一直是國(guó)內(nèi)研究的焦點(diǎn)問題�；�于糧食供應(yīng)鏈管理方法，研究糧食供應(yīng)鏈上糧食生產(chǎn)和經(jīng)營(yíng)主體的利益補(bǔ)償協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制，提高糧食供應(yīng)鏈整體競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，對(duì)穩(wěn)定糧食生產(chǎn)與構(gòu)建糧食安全保障體系具有重要理論和實(shí)踐意義。以黑龍江省糧食主產(chǎn)區(qū)為背景，分析商品糧供應(yīng)鏈上主體的利益關(guān)系，并選擇三級(jí)商品糧供應(yīng)鏈為研究對(duì)象，構(gòu)建出商品糧供應(yīng)鏈微觀組織結(jié)構(gòu)模型，為利益補(bǔ)償協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制構(gòu)建提供組織載體；首先，針對(duì)該供應(yīng)鏈中以加工企業(yè)為核心，糧食生產(chǎn)者為供應(yīng)商的利益關(guān)系，按照Stackelberg博弈理論，研究得出一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)的帶有罰金的協(xié)調(diào)契約，據(jù)此得出結(jié)論：糧食生產(chǎn)者不能履約帶來(lái)的額外集貨成本會(huì)損害供應(yīng)鏈整體利益，但政府補(bǔ)貼會(huì)使得糧食生產(chǎn)者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)能力變大；而糧食生產(chǎn)者自主從原糧現(xiàn)貨市場(chǎng)中集貨，可以幫助加工企業(yè)分擔(dān)糧源不穩(wěn)定風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，作為補(bǔ)償也從企業(yè)獲得比現(xiàn)貨市場(chǎng)高的契約價(jià)格。其次，針對(duì)商品糧三級(jí)單供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行研究，其中加工企業(yè)為核心，糧食生產(chǎn)者為供應(yīng)商，而經(jīng)銷商為加工企業(yè)銷售商。糧食生產(chǎn)者與糧食加工企業(yè)之間選擇帶有罰金的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)契約，其有兩種形式，一是糧食生產(chǎn)者接受罰金，二是糧食生產(chǎn)者自主集貨；而按照糧食加工企業(yè)與經(jīng)銷商之間是否選擇收入共享協(xié)調(diào)契約，也可以形成兩種形式，一是選擇普通批發(fā)價(jià)契約進(jìn)行交易，二是選擇在批發(fā)價(jià)基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建收入共享契約。因此，在商品糧三級(jí)單供應(yīng)鏈中可以形成四種契約組合，并且通過(guò)對(duì)四種契約組合的最優(yōu)訂購(gòu)量及利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行分析，得出糧食經(jīng)銷商的最優(yōu)訂購(gòu)量主要受到成品糧市場(chǎng)銷售價(jià)格和自身成本的影響，并且當(dāng)糧食加工企業(yè)集貨成本較小時(shí)，，可選擇糧食生產(chǎn)者接受罰金與收入共享組合契約；反之，選擇糧食生產(chǎn)者自主集貨與收入共享組合契約。研究商品糧三級(jí)單供應(yīng)鏈利益補(bǔ)償協(xié)調(diào)，可以有效指導(dǎo)糧食加工與生產(chǎn)，糧食加工企業(yè)與外省經(jīng)銷商的協(xié)調(diào)可以有效促進(jìn)黑龍江省糧食的對(duì)外銷售。
[Abstract]:Food security has always been the focus of domestic research. Based on the method of grain supply chain management, the interest compensation coordination mechanism of grain production and management in grain supply chain is studied to improve the overall competitive advantage of grain supply chain. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to stabilize grain production and build food security system. Taking the main grain production area of Heilongjiang Province as the background, this paper analyzes the interest relationship of the main body in the commodity grain supply chain. And choose the three-level commodity grain supply chain as the research object, construct the commodity grain supply chain micro-organization structure model, provide the organization carrier for the benefit compensation coordination mechanism construction; first, aiming at the processing enterprise as the core in the supply chain, According to the Stackelberg game theory, a kind of coordination contract with penalty is obtained, which is based on the Stackelberg game theory. The conclusion is as follows: the additional aggregate cost brought by the failure of grain producers to perform will harm the whole benefit of supply chain, but the government subsidy will increase the risk sharing capacity of grain producers; And grain producers can collect goods independently from the original grain spot market, which can help processing enterprises share the risk of food instability, and as compensation, they can also obtain higher contract prices from the enterprises than from the spot market. Secondly, According to the research of the three-stage single supply chain of commodity grain, in which the processing enterprise is the core, the grain producer is the supplier, and the distributor is the seller of the processing enterprise, the grain producer and the grain processing enterprise choose the risk sharing contract with fine. There are two forms, one is that grain producers accept fines, the other is that grain producers collect goods on their own; and according to whether grain processing enterprises and distributors choose a coordination contract for income sharing, two forms can also be formed. One is to choose the ordinary wholesale price contract for transaction, the other is to choose to build the income sharing contract on the basis of wholesale price. Therefore, four kinds of contract combinations can be formed in the three-stage single supply chain of commodity grain. And through the analysis of the optimal order quantity and profit of the four kinds of contract combination, it is concluded that the optimal order quantity of grain distributor is mainly affected by the market selling price of finished grain and its own cost, and when the cost of assembling grain processing enterprise is small, Grain producers can choose to accept the combination contract of fine and income sharing; on the other hand, choose the combination contract of independent collection and income sharing of grain producers. It can effectively guide grain processing and production, and the coordination between grain processing enterprises and distributors in other provinces can effectively promote the external sales of grain in Heilongjiang Province.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F326.11;F326.6

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