發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-28 15:01

【摘要】：進(jìn)入21世紀(jì)，世界流通產(chǎn)業(yè)迎來(lái)了巨大變革，大型連鎖超市在供應(yīng)鏈中的地位得到了大幅提升。在借鑒國(guó)外“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈建設(shè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，商務(wù)部和農(nóng)業(yè)部在2008年聯(lián)合發(fā)布了《商務(wù)部農(nóng)業(yè)部關(guān)于開展農(nóng)超對(duì)接試點(diǎn)工作的通知》，組織開展“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”試點(diǎn)工作，積極發(fā)展農(nóng)產(chǎn)品現(xiàn)代流通方式。2009年的中央一號(hào)文件也強(qiáng)調(diào)“支持大型連鎖超市和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品流通企業(yè)開展農(nóng)超對(duì)接”。據(jù)不完全統(tǒng)計(jì)，目前全國(guó)開展“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”的超市連鎖零售企業(yè)已超過(guò)800家，參加“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”的農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社超過(guò)1.5萬(wàn)家，直接受益農(nóng)民超過(guò)100萬(wàn)人，70個(gè)大中城市生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品經(jīng)超市銷售比重近18％，部分農(nóng)產(chǎn)品實(shí)現(xiàn)了24小時(shí)內(nèi)從農(nóng)田到超市。以江蘇省為例，江蘇通過(guò)“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”項(xiàng)目的開展，使直采的蔬菜價(jià)格比農(nóng)貿(mào)市場(chǎng)的便宜15%~20%；而作為江蘇本土的大型綜合連鎖超市，蘇果超市從2007年就已經(jīng)開始運(yùn)作“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”項(xiàng)目，目前農(nóng)超對(duì)接的商品比例達(dá)到了60%~70%。 學(xué)術(shù)界普遍認(rèn)為，“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈能夠解決我國(guó)農(nóng)戶種植與銷售的通路問(wèn)題，可以減少中間環(huán)節(jié)、增加農(nóng)戶收入、降低生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)價(jià)格。然而，考慮到我國(guó)現(xiàn)有的制度、市場(chǎng)以及生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品特有的“時(shí)間專用性”等約束條件，超市和農(nóng)戶之間是近乎壟斷對(duì)弱勢(shì)的關(guān)系。因此，“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈在實(shí)際中也出現(xiàn)了諸如對(duì)接雙方關(guān)系仍較松散、農(nóng)戶對(duì)接積極性受挫、對(duì)接經(jīng)營(yíng)呈現(xiàn)低效狀態(tài)等現(xiàn)象，也有不少學(xué)者對(duì)“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈在我國(guó)的發(fā)展前景表示了憂慮�！稗r(nóng)超對(duì)接”是我國(guó)近年來(lái)三農(nóng)政策持續(xù)關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)，研究改善“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作具有較強(qiáng)的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。因此，論文試圖結(jié)合實(shí)際，進(jìn)一步剖析當(dāng)前“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)際運(yùn)作困境的產(chǎn)生原因，努力為我國(guó)“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈的可持續(xù)發(fā)展提供決策借鑒。 論文首先構(gòu)建博弈數(shù)理模型，分析通道費(fèi)、交易契約特征、談判權(quán)力等因素在“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作中的作用，對(duì)于相關(guān)參數(shù)導(dǎo)致收購(gòu)價(jià)格、專用性投資水平、供應(yīng)鏈效用水平等決策變量的變化邏輯進(jìn)行刻畫；隨后，將農(nóng)戶公平偏好引入與超市的交易過(guò)程分析過(guò)程，研判公平偏好對(duì)于農(nóng)戶行為和超市行為的影響，探究公平偏好造成的供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作偏差；最后，借鑒行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)最新的研究成果，進(jìn)一步考慮參照點(diǎn)效應(yīng)，力爭(zhēng)在不同參照點(diǎn)框架下更加細(xì)致地描繪農(nóng)戶公平偏好的影響。研究結(jié)果表明：（1）收取通道費(fèi)并非是超市的最優(yōu)策略，在一定條件下，如果超市能夠以收入分享策略與農(nóng)戶合作，將能夠使雙方的收入得到Pareto改進(jìn)；（2）面對(duì)同樣的收購(gòu)價(jià)格，，農(nóng)戶公平偏好將會(huì)導(dǎo)致生產(chǎn)質(zhì)量水平的顯著降低，同時(shí)農(nóng)戶公平偏好也會(huì)迫使超市為了自身利益最大化而讓渡部分收益；（3）如果農(nóng)戶追求過(guò)于理想化的公平標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時(shí)，高強(qiáng)度的公平偏好將會(huì)造成“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作的效率損失。 論文研究也為進(jìn)行管理實(shí)踐提供了一系列有價(jià)值的啟示：（1）當(dāng)前我國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)規(guī)模小，組織化程度低，超市在“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈中必然處于主導(dǎo)地位，如果超市能維持市場(chǎng)公平交易的規(guī)則，那么“農(nóng)超對(duì)接”供應(yīng)鏈的持續(xù)發(fā)展將有保證；（2）超市應(yīng)放棄收取包括通道費(fèi)在內(nèi)的不合理費(fèi)用，維持市場(chǎng)公平交易的規(guī)則，與農(nóng)戶形成長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)定的合作關(guān)系，從技術(shù)指導(dǎo)、市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作和品牌建設(shè)等方面給予合作社扶持和指導(dǎo)，提高農(nóng)戶參與意愿，并最終實(shí)現(xiàn)“農(nóng)民增收、超市獲利、消費(fèi)者得實(shí)惠”的共贏局面。（3）政府應(yīng)加大對(duì)專業(yè)合作社的扶持力度，促進(jìn)其規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大，增加對(duì)其的技術(shù)指導(dǎo)、信息提供以及相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)計(jì)如冷鏈設(shè)備、質(zhì)量檢測(cè)設(shè)備和運(yùn)輸設(shè)備等硬件方面的投入，進(jìn)而增強(qiáng)合作社供給高質(zhì)量農(nóng)產(chǎn)品以及與超市談判的能力，實(shí)現(xiàn)銷售的主動(dòng)權(quán)。
[Abstract]:In the 21st century, the world circulation industry has undergone tremendous changes, and the status of large-scale supermarket chains in the supply chain has been greatly enhanced. The No.1 document of the Central Committee in 2009 also emphasized that "supporting large-scale supermarket chains and agricultural products circulation enterprises to carry out agricultural supermarket docking". According to incomplete statistics, there are more than 800 supermarket chains and retail enterprises engaged in "agricultural supermarket docking". More than 15,000 farmers'specialized cooperatives directly benefited more than 1 million farmers. Fresh agricultural products in 70 large and medium-sized cities accounted for nearly 18% of the total sales in supermarkets. Some agricultural products were sold from farmland to supermarkets within 24 hours. Taking Jiangsu Province as an example, through the project of "farmer-supermarket docking", the prices of vegetables picked directly were raised. It is 15% to 20% cheaper than the farmer's market, and as a large-scale comprehensive supermarket chain in Jiangsu Province, Suguo supermarket has been operating the "farmer's supermarket docking" project since 2007. At present, the proportion of farmer's supermarket docking goods has reached 60% to 70%.
Academics generally believe that the "farmer-supermarket docking" supply chain can solve the problem of farmers'cultivation and marketing access, reduce the intermediate links, increase farmers' income, and reduce the market price of fresh agricultural products. Therefore, there are some phenomena in the supply chain, such as the loose relationship between the two sides, the frustration of farmers'enthusiasm for docking, and the inefficiency of docking operation. Many scholars have expressed their worries about the development prospects of the supply chain in China. Agricultural Super-docking is the focus of our country's policy on agriculture, countryside and farmers in recent years. It is of great practical significance to study and improve the operation of the supply chain of Agricultural Super-docking. The sustainable development of chain should be used for reference.
Firstly, the paper constructs a game mathematical model to analyze the role of channel fee, transaction contract characteristics, negotiation power and other factors in the operation of the supply chain of "farmer-supermarket docking". It depicts the logic of the change of decision variables related to the relevant parameters leading to purchase price, specific investment level, supply chain efficiency and water use equality. In the process of analyzing the transaction process with supermarkets, we study the impacts of fairness preference on farmers'behavior and supermarket behavior, and explore the supply chain operation bias caused by fairness preference. Finally, we draw on the latest research results of behavioral economics, further consider the reference point effect, and strive to describe farmers' fairness in a more detailed way in the framework of different reference points. The results show that: (1) Collecting channel fees is not the best strategy for supermarkets. Under certain conditions, if supermarkets can cooperate with farmers through income sharing strategy, the income of both sides will be improved by Pareto; (2) Fair preference of farmers will lead to a significant decline in the level of production quality in the face of the same purchase price. At the same time, farmers'fairness preference will force supermarkets to transfer part of their profits to maximize their own interests; (3) If farmers pursue too idealized fairness criteria, high-intensity fairness preference will cause the efficiency loss of supply chain operation.
The paper also provides a series of valuable enlightenment for the management practice: (1) At present, China's agricultural production scale is small and the degree of organization is low. Supermarket is bound to play a leading role in the supply chain of "farmer-supermarket docking". If supermarkets can maintain the rules of fair trade in the market, then the sustainable development of "farmer-supermarket docking" supply chain will be achieved. (2) Supermarkets should give up collecting unreasonable fees including passage fees, maintain the rules of fair trade in the market, form long-term and stable cooperative relations with farmers, give support and guidance to cooperatives in terms of technical guidance, market operation and brand building, improve farmers'willingness to participate, and ultimately achieve "farmers' income, supermarkets gain" (3) The government should increase its support to professional cooperatives, promote their scale to expand, increase their technical guidance, provide information, and invest in hardware related to basic design such as cold chain equipment, quality testing equipment and transportation equipment, so as to enhance the supply of high-quality farmers by cooperatives. Products and the ability to negotiate with supermarkets to achieve sales initiative.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F326.6

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