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  本文選題：超額高管薪酬 + 會計穩(wěn)健性��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,高管薪酬問題引起了社會各界的高度重視。作為公司高管們工作的回報,高管薪酬的多少應(yīng)該能反映高管們的努力程度及其為公司做出的貢獻。而現(xiàn)實生活中,一些公司的高管拿著高額薪酬,公司的業(yè)績卻不盡如人意,這不免讓人們對高管薪酬的合理性產(chǎn)生了質(zhì)疑。因此,為了激勵高管們努力工作又避免其通過機會主義行為獲得超額薪酬,越來越多的公司開始將高管們的薪酬與公司的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)相掛鉤。此時,反映公司業(yè)績的會計信息的質(zhì)量高低就顯得尤為重要。 目前,很多研究都證實了會計穩(wěn)健性可以避免公司業(yè)績的高估,進而提高公司會計信息的質(zhì)量。公司越注重穩(wěn)健性,其會計確認(rèn)越謹(jǐn)慎,反映公司業(yè)績的會計信息就越不容易被高估,根據(jù)公司業(yè)績支付給高管們的薪酬可能就越趨于合理,高管們獲得的超額薪酬可能就越少。換句話說,公司越注重會計穩(wěn)健性,高管們通過夸大公司業(yè)績獲得超額薪酬的可能性就越小。 本文正是通過研究會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬的關(guān)系,以期驗證公司注重會計穩(wěn)健性是否可以抑制高管獲得超額薪酬。 依據(jù)委托代理理論和最優(yōu)契約理論的觀點,高管薪酬激勵契約中將高管薪酬與業(yè)績掛鉤的薪酬設(shè)計有利于對高管實施有效的激勵與約束,使得其決策行為最大程度地與股東財富最大化的目標(biāo)趨于一致,從而有利于緩解股東和管理層之間的代理沖突,并保護股東和公司的長期利益不受損失；但依據(jù)管理層權(quán)力理論的觀點,在高管薪酬與業(yè)績掛鉤的背景下,公司高管考慮到自身具有有限任期和承擔(dān)有限責(zé)任的客觀實際,可能更會利用手中權(quán)力實施機會主義行為,通過操縱業(yè)績獲得超額薪酬等途徑增加自身的額外收入,這是以公司和股東的長期利益遭受損失為代價的。因此,為了保護自身的長期利益不受損失,股東和債權(quán)人一方面要將公司高管的薪酬與業(yè)績相掛鉤,以激勵高管努力工作;另一方面,他們也會要求管理層在會計確認(rèn)時要更注重會計穩(wěn)健性,進而提高反映公司業(yè)績的信息質(zhì)量,這就在一定程度上抑制了高管基于夸大公司業(yè)績獲得超額薪酬的可能性。 依據(jù)上述理論分析,首先,本文對會計穩(wěn)健性的加強是否有助于減少超額高管薪酬的問題進行了實證檢驗；其次,如果公司注重會計穩(wěn)健性可以抑制高管獲得超額薪酬,那么當(dāng)公司業(yè)績對高管的激勵強度不同(即高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績的相關(guān)性不同)時,會計穩(wěn)健性的加強對超額高管薪酬的抑制作用是否會有差異,本文對此進行了分析；最后,考慮到我國的特殊國情,即國有企業(yè)的內(nèi)部治理機制與非國有企業(yè)之間有很多差異,在這種情況下,會計穩(wěn)健性的加強對超額高管薪酬的抑制作用在兩類企業(yè)中是否會有不同的效果,這是本文研究的第三個問題。 在會計穩(wěn)健性和超額高管薪酬兩個主要變量的度量方面,本文首先借鑒Iwasaki et al.(2012)對超額高管薪酬的度量方法,運用樣本公司高管前三名薪酬總額的數(shù)據(jù)對超額高管薪酬進行估計；然后,本文借鑒Basu模型度量會計穩(wěn)健性的方法對樣本公司的穩(wěn)健性進行度量和判斷；在此基礎(chǔ)上,引入相關(guān)控制變量構(gòu)建本文的主要回歸模型。 本文的研究結(jié)論分為以下三點： 第一,全樣本下會計穩(wěn)健性的加強對超額高管薪酬具有顯著的抑制作用,即公司越注重會計穩(wěn)健性,高管們基于夸大公司業(yè)績獲得的超額薪酬越少,會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬之間是顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。 第二,當(dāng)公司業(yè)績對高管的激勵強度越強時,會計穩(wěn)健性的加強對超額高管薪酬的抑制作用更明顯,會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系更顯著,即高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績的相關(guān)性越高時,公司更要注重會計穩(wěn)健性,以避免高管通過夸大公司業(yè)績獲得超額薪酬。 第三,與非國有企業(yè)相比,國有企業(yè)中會計穩(wěn)健性的加強對超額高管薪酬的抑制作用更明顯,會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系更顯著,即國有企業(yè)更應(yīng)注重會計穩(wěn)健性,以減少高管基于夸大公司業(yè)績獲得的超額薪酬。 本文的研究貢獻主要有以下兩個方面： 第一,本文首次運用中國上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),對會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系進行了實證研究,豐富了我國對于會計穩(wěn)健性的經(jīng)濟后果的研究內(nèi)容,拓展了我國對于超額高管薪酬的抑制措施的研究視角。 近年來,對于超額高管薪酬的研究中,國內(nèi)學(xué)者提取高管薪酬中的超額部分多是借鑒Core et al.(1999,2008)的估計方法,如吳育輝和吳世農(nóng)(2010)就將ROA納入到預(yù)期高管薪酬的估計之中,然后再根據(jù)實際薪酬提取出“超額部分”。然而這樣提取出的超額高管薪酬不能直接與會計穩(wěn)健性進行研究,因為ROA等業(yè)績指標(biāo)的確認(rèn)已受到會計穩(wěn)健性的影響。本文通過借鑒Iwasaki et al.(2012)對超額高管薪酬的度量方法,從上一年度的高管薪酬和當(dāng)年行業(yè)的高管平均薪酬的角度估計當(dāng)年預(yù)期的高管薪酬,并根據(jù)當(dāng)年實際取得的高管薪酬提取出高管薪酬的“超額部分”。這種度量方式克服了國內(nèi)以往研究的弊端,為直接研究會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系提供了一種新的實現(xiàn)方法。 第二,本文深入分析了公司業(yè)績對高管的激勵強度不同(即高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績的相關(guān)性不同)時,會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬的相關(guān)關(guān)系以及公司產(chǎn)權(quán)背景不同時,會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬的相關(guān)關(guān)系,從多個角度為我國政府監(jiān)管機構(gòu)不斷強調(diào)企業(yè)的會計確認(rèn)要注重穩(wěn)健性原則的運用提供了實證支持,證明了會計穩(wěn)健性在我國企業(yè)(尤其是國企)的管理層薪酬契約中扮演的角色不容忽視。 本文的研究局限主要有以下三個方面： 第一,樣本選擇方面的局限。受客觀條件的制約以及本文特定的研究條件所限,本文的樣本僅限于滬深兩市A股主板上市公司中的512家,共計4597個觀察值,樣本中公司的數(shù)量并不多。因此,本文的研究結(jié)論對于在其它特殊版塊上市的公司以及本文篩選樣本中刪除的公司是否適用,還需要進一步地探討。 第二,超額高管薪酬的度量方式的局限。本文對于超額高管薪酬的度量僅是以現(xiàn)金薪酬為基礎(chǔ)進行估計的。但近年來,股權(quán)激勵等長期薪酬激勵機制的逐漸建立會對會計穩(wěn)健性與超額高管薪酬的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響,企業(yè)關(guān)注會計穩(wěn)健性是否有助于提高長期激勵薪酬的有效性,仍需要深入探討,本文的研究并沒有涉及。 第三,控制變量設(shè)置的局限。由于超額高管薪酬受到多種因素的影響,本文在研究過程中考慮的控制變量很可能不夠全面,導(dǎo)致本文的控制變量設(shè)置中存在一定的局限性,但限于本人的時間和能力,對于控制變量設(shè)置的完善,還需要以后進行深入探討。
[Abstract]:In recent years , the problem of executive pay raises the great importance of the various sectors of society . As the return of the executives ' work , the executive pay should be able to reflect the level of their efforts and their contribution to the company . In real life , the executives of some companies hold high salaries , and the company ' s performance is not satisfactory . Therefore , in order to motivate the executives to work and avoid excessive pay through opportunism behavior , more and more companies have begun to link the salaries of executives to the performance of the company . At this time , the quality of accounting information reflecting the company ' s performance is particularly important .

At present , many researches have confirmed that accounting conservatism can avoid overvaluation of company ' s performance and further improve the quality of accounting information . The more careful the company pays attention to , the more cautious the accounting information reflects the company ' s performance , the less likely it is to reflect the company ' s performance . In other words , the more the company pays more attention to the robustness of the accounting , the less likely the executives can obtain excess pay by exaggerating the company ' s performance .

This article is to study the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay , with a view to verifying that the company pays attention to whether the accounting conservatism can restrain the executives from getting overcompensation .

According to the theory of principal agent and the theory of optimal contract , the compensation design of executive compensation incentive contract will benefit the effective encouragement and restriction of executive compensation , so that its decision - making behavior will be consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholder ' s wealth , which will help to alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and management , and protect the long - term interests of shareholders and companies from loss ;
On the other hand , in order to protect its long - term interests from loss , shareholders and creditors should pay more attention to accounting robustness and improve the quality of information reflecting the company ' s performance .

According to the above - mentioned theoretical analysis , firstly , this paper makes an empirical test on whether the strengthening of accounting conservatism contributes to the reduction of excess executive pay .
Secondly , if the company pays attention to the accounting conservatism , it can restrain the executives from getting overcompensation , then , when the company ' s performance is different from the incentive intensity of the executives ( that is , the correlation between the executive pay and the company ' s performance is different ) , there is a difference in the effect of accounting robustness on the excessive executive compensation .
Finally , considering the special situation of our country , that is , there are many differences between the internal governance mechanism of the state - owned enterprise and the non - state - owned enterprise . In this case , it is the third problem to study whether the effect of accounting conservatism on excess executive compensation will have different effects in the two types of enterprises .

In terms of accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation , this paper first draws on the measure method of excess executive compensation by IYANG et al . ( 2012 ) , and estimates the excess executive pay by using the data of the top three remuneration of sample company .
Then , we measure and judge the robustness of sample company by using the method of Basu model to measure the robustness of accounting ;
On this basis , the main regression model of this paper is constructed by introducing relevant control variables .

The conclusions of this paper are as follows :

First , the strengthening of accounting robustness under the whole sample has a significant effect on excess executive pay , that is , the more the company pays more attention to the robustness of accounting , the less the excess pay obtained by the executives on the basis of exaggerating the company ' s performance , the more significant negative correlation between the accounting conservatism and the excess executive pay .

Second , when the higher the incentive intensity of the executives , the stronger the accounting robustness , the negative correlation between the accounting robustness and the excess executive pay , that is , the higher the correlation between the executive pay and the company ' s performance , the higher the accounting robustness , so as to avoid the overcompensation of executives by exaggerating the company ' s performance .

Third , compared with non - state - owned enterprises , the strengthening of accounting conservatism in the state - owned enterprises is more obvious to the excessive executive compensation , and the negative correlation between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay is more significant , that is , the state - owned enterprises should pay more attention to the robustness of the accounting , so as to reduce the overcompensation paid by the executives on the basis of exaggerating the company ' s performance .

The research contributions of this paper mainly include the following two aspects :

First , this article makes an empirical study on the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay for the first time in China , enriches our country ' s research content on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism , and expands the research perspective of our country ' s restraining measures for excess executive pay .

In recent years , in the study of excess executive compensation , the excess of senior executive compensation is drawn from Core et al . ( 1999 , 2008 ) .

Secondly , this paper deeply analyzes the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay , and the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay when the company ' s performance is different from the incentive intensity of the executives ( i.e . , the correlation between executive pay and corporate performance ) .

The limitations of this paper mainly include the following three aspects :

First , the limitation of sample selection is limited by objective conditions and the research conditions specified in this paper . The samples in this paper are limited to 512 of listed companies in Shanghai - Shenzhen A - share board listed companies , and there are not many companies in the sample . Therefore , the conclusion of this paper is not only applicable to companies listed in other special blocks and whether the companies deleted in the screening samples are applicable , but also need to be further explored .

In recent years , the gradual establishment of incentive mechanism such as equity incentive has influenced the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation , and it is still necessary to probe into whether the accounting conservatism contributes to the improvement of the effectiveness of long - term incentive pay . The research in this paper is not involved .

Third , the limitation of control variable setting . Because of the influence of many factors , the control variable considered in this paper may not be comprehensive enough , which leads to some limitation in the control variable setting , but it is limited to my time and ability .
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F233;F272.92

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本文編號：1988158