農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營績效研究
本文選題:農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行 + 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) ; 參考:《湘潭大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文
【摘要】:股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ),股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的科學(xué)性直接決定著公司治理效率的高低,進(jìn)而影響著公司的經(jīng)營過程中的績效水平。因此提高公司經(jīng)營績效,就必須優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),完善公司治理機(jī)制。 銀行在一國經(jīng)濟(jì)中占據(jù)著基礎(chǔ)性和特殊性地位,農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行更是我國農(nóng)村金融的主力軍,在農(nóng)村金融發(fā)展中有著重要地位,農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行的經(jīng)營績效水平關(guān)系到農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。在三次金融改革實(shí)踐中,農(nóng)村信用社取得了一定發(fā)展成績,農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行由其改制產(chǎn)生并發(fā)展迅猛,同時(shí)也存在許多問題。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)普遍存在的問題是國有股和法人股占比偏高,股權(quán)相對(duì)集中,而社會(huì)公眾股東的股權(quán)相對(duì)分散,大股東身份不明確,導(dǎo)致“所有者缺位”,股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)很不合理,。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的不合理,影響農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行的經(jīng)營績效的提高,阻礙了農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行自身發(fā)展,同時(shí)不利于推進(jìn)我國農(nóng)村金融體制改革與創(chuàng)新。從商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營績效的理論研究入手,結(jié)合農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行特殊性,立足于我國農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行改革發(fā)展實(shí)踐,構(gòu)建了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與綜合績效關(guān)系的模型,利用因子分析法對(duì)農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行綜合績效進(jìn)行測(cè)算,從股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度與股權(quán)屬性三個(gè)方面對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行分析。實(shí)證表明第一大股東持股比例與農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營績效呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,前十大股東持股比例與農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行績效關(guān)系不顯著,非控股股東的制衡能力與績效正相關(guān)。同時(shí),農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行法人股比例與其績效之間為復(fù)雜的倒U型關(guān)系,一大股國有性質(zhì)與農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行績效負(fù)相關(guān),自然人股與農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行績效負(fù)相關(guān)。基于此,,文章提出適度集中農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、引進(jìn)戰(zhàn)略投資者多元化股權(quán)構(gòu)成、完善激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制等政策建議,力圖從建立科學(xué)合理的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)角度來促進(jìn)農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行績效水平的提高。
[Abstract]:The ownership structure is the property right foundation of the corporate governance structure. The scientific nature of the ownership structure directly determines the efficiency of corporate governance and then affects the performance level of the company in the process of operation. Therefore, to improve corporate performance, we must optimize equity structure and improve corporate governance mechanism. Banks occupy a fundamental and special position in a country's economy. Rural commercial banks are the main force of rural finance in China and play an important role in the development of rural finance. The management performance level of rural commercial banks is related to the healthy development of rural economy. In the practice of three financial reforms, rural credit cooperatives have made certain achievements, and rural commercial banks have developed rapidly from the reform, and at the same time, there are many problems. The common problems of ownership structure are that the proportion of state-owned stock and legal person stock is on the high side, and the stock right is relatively concentrated, while the stock right of the public shareholders is relatively dispersed, and the identity of the majority shareholder is not clear, which leads to the absence of the owner and the unreasonable ownership structure. The unreasonable ownership structure affects the improvement of the management performance of the rural commercial banks, hinders the development of the rural commercial banks, and is not conducive to the reform and innovation of the rural financial system in China. Starting with the theoretical research on the ownership structure and management performance of commercial banks, combining the particularity of rural commercial banks, based on the reform and development practice of China's rural commercial banks, this paper constructs a model of the relationship between equity structure and comprehensive performance. This paper uses factor analysis method to measure the comprehensive performance of rural commercial banks and analyzes the ownership structure from three aspects: ownership concentration degree equity balance degree and ownership property. The empirical results show that the proportion of the largest shareholders has a positive correlation with the performance of rural commercial banks, the proportion of the top ten shareholders has no significant relationship with the performance of rural commercial banks, and the balance ability of non-controlling shareholders is positively related to the performance of rural commercial banks. At the same time, the proportion of legal person shares in rural commercial banks and their performance is a complex inverted U-shaped relationship, a large state-owned shares and rural commercial banks performance negative correlation, natural person shares and rural commercial bank performance negative correlation. Based on this, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions, such as moderate concentration of ownership structure of rural commercial banks, introduction of diversified ownership structure of strategic investors, improvement of incentive and restraint mechanism, etc. This paper tries to promote the improvement of rural commercial bank's performance level from the angle of establishing scientific and reasonable ownership structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F271;F832.35;F830.42
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