發(fā)布時間：2018-06-16 01:16

  本文選題：轉(zhuǎn)移定價 + 企業(yè)目標(biāo)��； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：轉(zhuǎn)移定價長期以來一直被認(rèn)為,是分權(quán)公司中一個普遍的管理控制工具,吸引了廣泛背景研究者的關(guān)注,在實務(wù)界和理論界受到熱議。伴隨著決策制定的分權(quán)化和多部門組織中利潤中心產(chǎn)生,以及組織形式的多樣化,轉(zhuǎn)移定價系統(tǒng)設(shè)計日漸成為一個現(xiàn)實而尖銳的問題。管理會計教科書中,通常將轉(zhuǎn)移定價描繪成分權(quán)和多部門公司的協(xié)同工具,其作用是通過提供中間產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)等的估價,來有效促進(jìn)公司內(nèi)部利潤中心間的交易,對跨國公司,在選擇轉(zhuǎn)移價格時,也強調(diào)稅負(fù)優(yōu)化和稅收遵從的重要性。而分權(quán)的成功和協(xié)同的實現(xiàn),有賴于正確轉(zhuǎn)移定價系統(tǒng)的建立。 管理控制工具,是為企業(yè)目標(biāo)服務(wù)的,轉(zhuǎn)移定價也不例外。本文分析設(shè)定企業(yè)目標(biāo)為利潤滿意,為實現(xiàn)該目標(biāo),試圖構(gòu)建這樣的轉(zhuǎn)移定價決策路徑：分析中間產(chǎn)品有無外部市場或市場結(jié)構(gòu)情況,借助轉(zhuǎn)移定價的資源配置、稅負(fù)最小化、盈余管理、少數(shù)股東權(quán)益、市場策略以及調(diào)整方法等多個影響因素,它們能作用到的多個具體目標(biāo)有利潤最大化、子單元利潤計劃、收入最大化(市場占有率)、稅收遵從等,所要研究的就是通過怎樣的定價策略同時優(yōu)化達(dá)成之,這些具體目標(biāo)的折衷即為利潤滿意的企業(yè)目標(biāo)。一個優(yōu)秀的轉(zhuǎn)移定價系統(tǒng)應(yīng)該滿足若干要求：目標(biāo)一致,即轉(zhuǎn)移定價系統(tǒng)必須激勵利潤中心經(jīng)理追逐其自身利益時的行為能引導(dǎo)公司作為一個整體獲得成功；績效評價,即轉(zhuǎn)移價格必須使得總部管理層根據(jù)利潤中心對公司利潤的各自貢獻(xiàn),盡可能準(zhǔn)確評價其績效；子單元自治,即系統(tǒng)必須激勵經(jīng)理提高效率,并且不削弱利潤中心的部門自治。此外,系統(tǒng)還應(yīng)易于應(yīng)用。 轉(zhuǎn)移定價,這是一個會計人員、管理學(xué)者和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都在關(guān)注的話題。為達(dá)到一個最優(yōu)解決方案,或達(dá)到一個接近方案,諸多方法被嘗試。本文綜合定性分析與定量分析、理論探討與實踐應(yīng)用,具體研究方法有：定性方法——文獻(xiàn)分析法,搜集、鑒別、整理、分析、研究國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)；定量方法——數(shù)學(xué)模型法——線性規(guī)劃方法,運用線性規(guī)劃方法的對偶原理求解影子價格,計算機會成本,確定轉(zhuǎn)移價格；分析式研究,探討如何以現(xiàn)行市場價格為基準(zhǔn),實施一定的內(nèi)部折扣,實現(xiàn)有效產(chǎn)出；定量方法——數(shù)學(xué)模型法——目標(biāo)規(guī)劃方法,構(gòu)建轉(zhuǎn)移定價數(shù)學(xué)模型,求解轉(zhuǎn)移價格,實現(xiàn)多重目標(biāo)優(yōu)化以達(dá)成企業(yè)目標(biāo)；經(jīng)驗研究——案例研究,構(gòu)建目標(biāo)規(guī)劃模型,結(jié)合一家中國跨國公司進(jìn)行實際應(yīng)用及分析。 全文提出并試圖回答轉(zhuǎn)移定價的四個理論問題,中間產(chǎn)品市場具有買方壟斷勢力下的定價決策；無外部市場時的競爭使用中間產(chǎn)品的機會成本；市場不完全時基于市價基準(zhǔn)的內(nèi)部折扣定價策略；如何折衷實現(xiàn)多重目標(biāo)。具體研究所依據(jù)的是這樣的轉(zhuǎn)移定價決策路徑：根據(jù)轉(zhuǎn)移物有無市場或市場結(jié)構(gòu),結(jié)合企業(yè)的組織形式,分析多個轉(zhuǎn)移定價影響因素對各個具體目標(biāo)的作用,研究怎樣的轉(zhuǎn)移定價策略能同時實現(xiàn)這些具體目標(biāo),即意味著達(dá)成利潤滿意的企業(yè)目標(biāo)。 (1)中間產(chǎn)品市場競爭不完全時,下游子單元從內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移的同時,又從外部市場購買。為實現(xiàn)企業(yè)目標(biāo),如何決策轉(zhuǎn)移數(shù)量、價格和外購數(shù)量、價格。以單一企業(yè)為例,設(shè)有上游和下游兩個利潤中心,下游購買部門具有買方壟斷努力,來說明定價決策及目標(biāo)實現(xiàn)。 為達(dá)成公司整體收益最大化,以邊際分析技術(shù)確定下游部門需使用的最優(yōu)中間產(chǎn)品數(shù)量及數(shù)量處對應(yīng)的轉(zhuǎn)移價格,及最優(yōu)內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移數(shù)量和外部采購數(shù)量,并對買方壟斷勢力下的定價決策與賣方壟斷勢力下的定價決策進(jìn)行對比分析。研究的不足之處在于,完全、對稱的信息狀態(tài)假設(shè),忽視了道德風(fēng)險、投資套牢等激勵問題；子單元自治權(quán)削弱,總部介入定價有違分權(quán)理念；未考慮上游部門與外部市場在中間產(chǎn)品市場上的競爭。 (2)中間產(chǎn)品無外部市場,考慮中間產(chǎn)品有競爭使用時的機會成本,以線性規(guī)劃技術(shù)求解影子價格,作為轉(zhuǎn)移價格的重要組成部分。稀缺資源機會成本的定價問題,有兩種情況,一是利潤中心以中間產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)這種最終產(chǎn)品、而不是其他最終產(chǎn)品的機會成本,最終產(chǎn)品均有外部市場；二是利潤中心以原材料等生產(chǎn)這種中間產(chǎn)品(無外部市場)、而不是另一種中間產(chǎn)品(有外部市場)的機會成本。 以企業(yè)利潤最大化為目標(biāo),采用線性規(guī)劃計算中間產(chǎn)品影子價格,在影子價格基礎(chǔ)上確定機會成本進(jìn)行最優(yōu)轉(zhuǎn)移定價決策。為了解轉(zhuǎn)移價格的適用范圍,對影子價格靈敏度分析,判斷影子價格保持不變時、收益系數(shù)和資源約束所允許的變化區(qū)間。研究存在的不足有,機會成本具有時變性,因為影子價格可能是變化的,必須持續(xù)關(guān)注機會成本的適用性和恰當(dāng)性；模型需設(shè)置多重假設(shè),包括：需求曲線已知且呈現(xiàn)靜態(tài),成本函數(shù)是線性的,而且可以事先估計最終產(chǎn)品的替代用途和盈利能力；完全、對稱信息狀態(tài),沒有考慮公司總部、轉(zhuǎn)入方和轉(zhuǎn)出方三者之間的信息不對稱、不完全情況,也就沒有分析目標(biāo)不一致。 (3)中間產(chǎn)品市場不完全時,基于市價基準(zhǔn)上的最優(yōu)內(nèi)部折扣定價策略。公司為內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移定價之目的,可否依靠外部市場價格,施以內(nèi)部折扣的形式對其調(diào)節(jié),來改善乃至最大化公司期望總體利潤。問題分為兩個步驟按序分析：一是內(nèi)部交易會否受折扣的影響；二是設(shè)計的折扣規(guī)則所計算得出的銷售量和最終價格能否最大化公司總體利潤。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn),轉(zhuǎn)移物內(nèi)部定價如按市價扣除適當(dāng)?shù)恼劭?可避免邊際定價方法的不足以及市場價格定價可能導(dǎo)致的雙重邊際化；內(nèi)外部交易存在的成本差異,對實現(xiàn)最優(yōu)資源配置的折扣確實存在影響,但影響并不能完全傳遞。局限之處,忽略了下游部門和外部購買者在最終產(chǎn)品市場上的相互替代或競爭；不可行性,參數(shù)化部門的收益和成本函數(shù)時,如果相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的狀態(tài)是多維的,難以推斷需求的價格彈性；代理成本欠缺,這是由于忽略了道德風(fēng)險,從而導(dǎo)致模型中設(shè)定的成本不包含代理成本。 (4)定價如何決策,折衷實現(xiàn)更多轉(zhuǎn)移定價影響因素下的多重且相互沖突目標(biāo)�？紤]更加完備、周全的轉(zhuǎn)移定價影響因素,分析其對企業(yè)目標(biāo)中若干具體目標(biāo)的綜合作用,以目標(biāo)規(guī)劃技術(shù)通過定價影響因素同時實現(xiàn)多個目標(biāo)。 研究中,以一跨國公司為例,根據(jù)跨國公司的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境,確定多重具體目標(biāo),分析其實現(xiàn)的優(yōu)先順序,構(gòu)建轉(zhuǎn)移定價目標(biāo)規(guī)劃模型,求解并存且可能沖突的多個目標(biāo)的滿意解。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),以目標(biāo)規(guī)劃方法達(dá)成利潤滿意的企業(yè)目標(biāo)是可行的。但同時也存在著這樣的一些不足,眾多條件要求已知,不同國家(地區(qū))子單元的稅收、關(guān)稅、轉(zhuǎn)移產(chǎn)品的成本函數(shù)及數(shù)量、風(fēng)險損失率、市場價格等均可知或可估算；信度存疑,部分參數(shù)屬企業(yè)商業(yè)秘密,無法通過公開渠道獲取,只能合理估計賦值,這直接影響轉(zhuǎn)移定價決策結(jié)論的客觀和準(zhǔn)確；損害子單元自治,目標(biāo)規(guī)劃技術(shù)確定轉(zhuǎn)移價格時,主要由總部有關(guān)人員建立模型、輸入數(shù)據(jù),子公司管理者的話語權(quán)就是與總部協(xié)商本部門利潤目標(biāo)和權(quán)因子等的賦值,分權(quán)有所忽視；效度存疑，，會計等管理人員缺乏相應(yīng)知識、技能,通常不具備建立轉(zhuǎn)移定價模型之能力,而且信息不對稱下的各單元的利已行為,其他部門沒有全面、準(zhǔn)確信息,影響實踐應(yīng)用。 全文研究還存在著某些限制,諸如,設(shè)定技術(shù)表現(xiàn)出規(guī)模報酬不變的特點,未考慮規(guī)模報酬遞減或遞增的情況；忽視了可能的優(yōu)先尋求外部合作的心理,如果完全自由選擇,某些公司的采購或銷售子單元更愿意與外部渠道交易,原因之一是外部渠道能提供更令人滿意的服務(wù)或更市場化的合作,原因之二是分權(quán)制公司中經(jīng)常存在的內(nèi)部競爭�？偛抗芾碚邞�(yīng)該充分意識到可能出現(xiàn)的強烈政治色彩對轉(zhuǎn)移價格的影響,這種情況下,最高管理者無法保證生產(chǎn)能力空閑時,采購或銷售子單元會自愿在內(nèi)部渠道交易。 設(shè)定的前提、條件,及存在的限制、不足,使得進(jìn)一步深入研究有了必要。即使解決了這些問題,也不意味著轉(zhuǎn)移定價解決方案是完美的。迄今為止,尚不存在一個使組織整體做出最合適的轉(zhuǎn)移定價決策的通用原則,對任何一種轉(zhuǎn)移定價方法,都不能說是絕對正確。正如諸多學(xué)者認(rèn)為的,公司對轉(zhuǎn)移價格選擇的問題是出了名的困難,轉(zhuǎn)移定價方略的研究仍需上下而求索。
[Abstract]:Transfer pricing has long been considered as a universal management control tool in decentralization companies, attracting the attention of a wide range of researchers and heated discussions in the practical and theoretical circles. With the decentralization of decision-making and the production of profit centers in multi sector organizations, the diversification of organizational forms, and the design of transfer pricing systems In management accounting textbooks, management accounting textbooks usually transfer pricing to depict composition rights and multi sector companies. The role is to effectively promote intra company profits through the valuation of intermediate products and services, and to transnational corporations, when choosing transfer prices, it is also emphasized. The importance of tax optimization and tax compliance, and the success and synergy of decentralization depends on the establishment of a correct transfer pricing system.
The management control tool is to serve the goal of the enterprise, and the transfer pricing is no exception. This paper analyzes the goal of the enterprise for profit satisfaction. In order to achieve this goal, it tries to construct such a transfer pricing decision path: the analysis of the external market or market structure of the intermediate products, the allocation of resources with transfer pricing, the minimization of tax burden, and the surplus. Management, minority shareholders' equity, market strategy, and adjustment methods have many factors, such as maximization of profit, subunit profit plan, income maximization (market share), tax compliance, and so on. A good transfer pricing system should meet a number of requirements: a good transfer pricing system should meet a number of requirements: the goal is consistent, that is, the transfer pricing system must encourage the profit center manager to pursue its own interests to guide the company as a whole, and the performance evaluation, that is, the transfer price must make the headquarters management. According to the respective contribution of the profit center to the profit of the company, the layer is as accurate as possible to evaluate its performance. Sub unit autonomy, that is, the system must encourage the manager to improve the efficiency and not weaken the departmental autonomy of the profit center. In addition, the system should be easily applied.
Transfer pricing is a topic of concern for accountants, management scholars and economists. In order to achieve an optimal solution, or to reach a close plan, many methods are tried. This paper combines qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, theoretical discussion and practical application. The qualitative method, literature analysis method, is used in this paper. Collect, identify, organize, analyze, study the domestic and foreign literature; quantitative method - mathematical model method - linear programming method, use the dual principle of linear programming to solve the shadow price, the cost of the computer, determine the transfer price, and discuss how to implement certain internal discounts on the basis of the current market price. Present effective output; quantitative method - mathematical model method - target planning method, construct transfer pricing mathematical model, solve transfer price, realize multiple objective optimization to achieve enterprise goal, experience research - case study, construct target planning model, and carry out practical application and analysis in combination with a national multinational corporation.
The full text puts forward and tries to answer the four theoretical problems of transfer pricing. The intermediate product market has a pricing decision under the monopoly power of the buyer; the opportunity cost of the competitive use of intermediate products without the external market; the internal discount pricing strategy based on the market price benchmark when the market is incomplete; how to achieve multiple goals in a compromise. Concrete Research Institute It is based on such a transfer pricing decision path: according to whether the transfer is market or market structure, combined with the organization form of the enterprise, it analyzes the effect of multiple transfer pricing factors on the specific targets, and studies how the transfer pricing strategy can achieve these specific targets at the same time, that is, to achieve the goal of profit satisfaction.
(1) when the market competition in the intermediate product is not complete, the sub travel unit is transferred from the inside and purchased from the external market. In order to achieve the goal of the enterprise, how to make the decision to transfer the quantity, the price and the quantity of the foreign purchase and the price. In the case of a single enterprise, there are two profits in the upstream and downstream, and the downstream purchasing department has a buyer's monopoly effort. Price decision and goal realization.
In order to maximize the overall profit of the Achieve Inc, the marginal analysis technology is used to determine the corresponding transfer price, the optimal internal transfer quantity and the quantity of external purchase, and the pricing decision under the buyer's monopoly power and the seller's monopoly power. The deficiency lies in the complete, symmetrical information state hypothesis, ignoring the incentive problems such as moral hazard and investment imprisonment, the weakening of the autonomy of sub units, the idea of decentralization of the headquarters intervention pricing, and the lack of consideration of the competition between the upstream and external markets in the intermediate product market.
(2) the intermediate product has no external market, considering the opportunity cost of the competitive use of the intermediate products, solving the shadow price by linear programming technology as an important part of the transfer price. The pricing problem of the opportunity cost of scarce resources has two cases, one is that the profit center produces the final product with the intermediate product, not the other final product. The opportunity cost of the product, the final product has the external market; two is the profit center production of the intermediate products (no external market) with raw materials, and not the opportunity cost of another intermediate product (external market).
Aiming at the maximization of enterprise profits, the linear programming is used to calculate the shadow price of intermediate products, and the optimal transfer pricing decision is made on the basis of shadow price to determine the opportunity cost. In order to understand the application scope of the transfer price, the sensitivity analysis of the shadow price, the judgment of the constant shadow price holding, the income coefficient and the resource constraints are allowed. Change interval. There are shortcomings in the study. Opportunity cost is time-varying, because the shadow price may be changed, it must continue to pay attention to the applicability and appropriateness of the opportunity cost; the model needs to set multiple hypotheses, including: the demand curve is known and static, the cost function is linear, and the replacement of the final product can be estimated in advance. Generation use and profitability; complete, symmetrical information state, without considering the company's headquarters, the asymmetric information between the three parties and the transferor, and the incomplete situation, and there is no analysis of the inconsistencies.
(3) when the intermediate product market is incomplete, the best internal discount pricing strategy is based on the market price benchmark. For the purpose of internal transfer pricing, the company can rely on the external market price and adjust it in the form of internal discounts to improve and maximize the overall profit of the company. The problem is divided into two steps in order: one is internal. Whether the transaction will be affected by the discount; two, whether the sales volume and final price calculated by the discount rule can maximize the overall profit of the company.
It is found that the internal pricing of transfer objects, such as deducting appropriate discounts according to market prices, can avoid the shortage of marginal pricing methods and the double marginalization that may lead to the market price pricing; the difference in cost of internal and external transactions does have a sound effect on the discount of the optimal allocation of resources, but the impact can not be completely transmitted. Limitations, limitations, Ignoring the mutual substitution or competition between the downstream sector and the external buyer in the final product market; infeasibility, the income and cost function of the parameterized sector, if the state of the related field is multidimensional, it is difficult to deduce the price elasticity of the demand; the agency cost is deficient, which is due to neglecting the moral hazard, resulting in the establishment of the model. The fixed cost does not include the agency cost.
(4) how to make the pricing decision and compromise the multiple and conflicting objectives under the influence factors of more transfer pricing. Consider the more complete and comprehensive factors of transfer pricing, analyze its comprehensive effect on some specific goals in the enterprise goal, and achieve multiple goals by the target planning technology through the pricing factors.
In the study, a multinational corporation is taken as an example, according to the internal and external environment of the multinational corporation, to determine the multiple specific objectives, analyze the priority of its realization, construct the model of the transfer pricing goal planning, and solve the satisfactory solution of the multiple targets that coexist and may conflict. The study finds that the goal of achieving the profit satisfaction with the target planning method is feasible. But at the same time, there are some shortcomings, and many conditions are known. The tax, tariff, the cost function and quantity of the transfer products, the risk loss rate, the market price are all known or estimated. The reliability is doubtful, some of the parameters are business secrets of the enterprise and can not be obtained through public channels, only reasonable. Estimate assignment, which directly affects the objective and accurate of the conclusion of the transfer pricing decision; damage sub unit autonomy, when the target planning technology determines the transfer price, mainly by the headquarters related personnel to establish the model, input the data, the voice of the manager of the subsidiary is the assignment of the profit target and the right factor of the headquarters in consultation with the headquarters. Ignoring, validity, accounting and other managers lack the knowledge and skills, usually do not have the ability to set up a transfer pricing model, and the profit of the units under the information asymmetry, and the other departments have no comprehensive, accurate information and influence the practical application.
There are some limitations in the full text research, such as the setting of technology that shows the characteristics of scale return, without considering the diminishing or increasing scale of return on scale, neglecting the possible preference for external cooperation, and if it is completely free to choose, some companies' purchasing or selling sub units are more willing to trade with external channels for reasons. First, the external channel can provide more satisfactory service or more marketable cooperation. The two reason is the internal competition that often exists in the decentralization company. The headquarters manager should be fully aware of the possible influence of strong political color on the transfer price. In this case, the highest manager can not guarantee the production capacity to be idle. Buying or selling sub units will voluntarily trade in internal channels.
The preconditions, conditions, and limitations of existence are necessary to make further research necessary. Even if these problems are solved, it does not mean that the transfer pricing solution is perfect. So far, there is no general principle to make the organization make the most appropriate transfer pricing decision, and to any kind of transfer pricing party. The law is not absolutely correct. As many scholars believe, the problem of the choice of the transfer price is difficult, and the study of the transfer pricing strategy still needs to be sought.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275.2

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