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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：勞動(dòng)合同的法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析　出處：《中國(guó)政法大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 勞動(dòng)合同 關(guān)系性合同 勞動(dòng)合同的效率 勞動(dòng)合同法律分析和博弈分析

【摘要】： 法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析是重要的法學(xué)方法論,它所展示的優(yōu)勢(shì)在于它提供了實(shí)證的分析方法,為制定法律、實(shí)施法律以及法律實(shí)施的效果作出預(yù)測(cè)。在國(guó)外已經(jīng)有許多法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)者將法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析方法應(yīng)用到部門法中去,實(shí)踐證明這是可行的,也是有效率的。但由于法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)在我國(guó)研究的時(shí)間并不長(zhǎng),其分析方法和價(jià)值并不為人所熟知,大部分的著作只停留在介紹國(guó)外法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的層面上。到目前為止只有極少數(shù)法學(xué)學(xué)者將經(jīng)濟(jì)分析的方法運(yùn)用部門法的分析中去,具體到勞動(dòng)法領(lǐng)域就更少了。所以本文是一次新的嘗試,用法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析作為法學(xué)方法論來分析正在制定的勞動(dòng)合同法;目的在于為法律的制定和實(shí)施提供新的視角,同時(shí)也追求對(duì)立法有所裨益。在本文中主要應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中理性人的假設(shè)和市場(chǎng)交易的理論(包括有限理性、信息不對(duì)稱理論、激勵(lì)與投機(jī)的理論),對(duì)勞動(dòng)合同法的特征和效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行分析;另外還運(yùn)用了博弈論的最新研究成果和交易談判理論對(duì)勞動(dòng)合同關(guān)系進(jìn)行法律博弈分析。 具體而言,本文分為三部分:導(dǎo)論和三章正文。 首先在導(dǎo)論中說明了勞動(dòng)合同法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析的路徑即遵循從實(shí)證分析入手,再到規(guī)范分析的思路,運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論的行為預(yù)測(cè)理論來評(píng)判和預(yù)測(cè)具體勞動(dòng)法律制度和法律規(guī)則的實(shí)施效果,并且分析了為什么可以將法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析的方法運(yùn)用于勞動(dòng)合同法。 接下來,在第一章回顧了勞動(dòng)合同和在世界范圍內(nèi)的發(fā)展過程,使我們明白了勞動(dòng)合同經(jīng)歷的不同階段和為什么會(huì)產(chǎn)生這些不同類型的合同,說明了勞動(dòng)合同的特征,并總結(jié)了勞動(dòng)合同在當(dāng)前新時(shí)代背景下的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)。其次介紹了關(guān)系合同以及在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)中的普適性,總結(jié)出作為關(guān)系合同與勞動(dòng)合同的契合。對(duì)歷史回顧的目的在于對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)的思考,現(xiàn)實(shí)中勞動(dòng)合同關(guān)系中存在的種種問題把我們的注意力吸引到經(jīng)濟(jì)分析領(lǐng)域中來。最后分析了法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究路徑和優(yōu)越性。 在第二章中運(yùn)用效率的分析方法說明了勞動(dòng)合同立法遵循的效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)是帕雷托改善的。勞動(dòng)合同作為關(guān)系合同主要原因在于其不完全性,而不完全性來自于信息的不對(duì)稱、有限理性;上述的原因?qū)е碌慕Y(jié)果是投機(jī)主義和投機(jī)行為的存在。法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析和法律博弈分析告訴我們,在制定法律時(shí)要考慮到規(guī)則對(duì)行為選擇的激勵(lì)和影響。法律規(guī)則目標(biāo)和結(jié)果是否一致,多大程度得滿足,主要通過討價(jià)還價(jià)最終達(dá)成雙方可以一致預(yù)測(cè)到的規(guī)則和結(jié)果來實(shí)現(xiàn)。因?yàn)檫@種情況下的法律規(guī)則是符合理性選擇理論的、是自我實(shí)施的,是目標(biāo)和實(shí)際效果的一致。勞動(dòng)合同關(guān)系的不完全性、強(qiáng)人身性和最大誠(chéng)信性和信賴性恰恰證明了將博弈論引入勞動(dòng)合同立法的重要性。法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析的一切努力在于分析法律制度的結(jié)構(gòu)和預(yù)測(cè)法律實(shí)施的實(shí)際效果和長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)影響。 在第三章里,我們運(yùn)用效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、激勵(lì)和行為選擇的關(guān)系以及邊際效用遞減原理,對(duì)勞動(dòng)合同法(草案)中的具體法律規(guī)則和制度進(jìn)行了法律經(jīng)濟(jì)分析;并得出勞動(dòng)合同法立法宗旨應(yīng)該傾向于保護(hù)勞動(dòng)者合法權(quán)益和在設(shè)置培訓(xùn)費(fèi)用和違約金時(shí)應(yīng)考慮的法律規(guī)則的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)影響的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:The economic analysis of law is an important method of law theory, it shows the advantage is that it provides the empirical analysis method, for the formulation of laws, law enforcement and law enforcement effect forecast. In other countries there have been many scholars of law and economics law and economic analysis method is applied to the Department of law, the practice proves that it is feasible also, there is efficiency. But because of legal economics research in China is not a long time, the analysis method and value are not well known, most of the works only on the introduction of foreign legal economics. So far, only a handful of legal scholars will be analyzed by the method of economic analysis of law department in specific to the field of labor law, even less. So this is a new attempt, as legal methodology to analyze the labor contract law is formulated for the purpose of economic analysis of law; Is to provide a new perspective for the formulation and implementation of the law, but also the pursuit of the legislation. In this paper the main application of rational assumption in economics and market transactions (including the theory of limited rationality, information asymmetry theory, incentive theory and speculation), and efficiency standards on the characteristics of the labor contract law analysis the application of game theory; in addition, the latest research results and negotiation theory on labor contract legal game analysis.
Specifically, this article is divided into three parts: introduction and three chapters.
First, in the introduction of the path of economic analysis of law of labor contract which follows from the analysis of the empirical and normative analysis to the idea of using the economics theory of behavior prediction effect theory to judge and predict the specific labor legal system and the rule of law, and analyzes why can be the method of economic analysis of law used in labor contract law.
Next, in the first chapter reviews the labor contract and within the scope of world development process, different stages enables us to understand the experience of the labor contract and why these different types of contracts, explains the characteristics of the labor contract, and summarized in the current context of a new era of development trend. Secondly introduces the relationship of labor contract in modern society, contract and universality, summed up as the relationship between the contract and labor contract agreement. Thinking of the reality of history review, problems existing in the labor contract relationship in reality to attract our attention to the economic analysis in the field. The final analysis of the research on the path of law and economics and superiority.
In the second chapter, using analysis method of efficiency shows that the labor contract legislation should follow the standard of efficiency is the Pareto improvement of the labor contract. As the main reason is the incomplete contract relationship, and asymmetric incomplete information from the limited rationality; the reason is the result of speculation and speculation there. Analysis of the legal and economic analysis of law game theory tells us that in the formulation of laws should take into account the rules of behavior choice motivation and influence. The rule of law and the results are the same, how satisfied, mainly through the two sides can reach a bargain to the consensus forecast rules and results achieved. Because the rule of law next is in line with the theory of rational choice, is self enforcing, is the goal and the actual effect of the agreement. The incomplete labor contract relationship, and the body. The most trustworthiness and trustworthiness just prove the importance of introducing game theory into labor contract legislation. All efforts of legal economic analysis lie in analyzing the structure of legal system and predicting the actual effect and long-term influence of law implementation.
In the third chapter, we use the efficiency standard, the relationship between incentive and behavior choice and the principle of diminishing marginal utility, the labor contract law (Draft) in the specific legal rules and regulations for the economic analysis of law; and the legislative purpose of the labor contract law should favor the long-term impact to preserving the legitimate rights and interests of workers and the legal rules set the cost of training and the penalty should be considered in the conclusion.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：D912.5;D90-05

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 立花聰;《勞動(dòng)合同法》的無固定期限勞動(dòng)合同制度研究[D];華東政法大學(xué);2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 陳茜;無固定期限勞動(dòng)合同問題研究[D];廈門大學(xué);2009年

2 朱志敏;我國(guó)無固定期限勞動(dòng)合同法律規(guī)則的完善[D];吉林大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1384510