發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-10 23:42

  本文選題：跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：碳排放權(quán)交易　出處：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷發(fā)展,溫室氣體的排放已經(jīng)成為環(huán)境氣候惡化的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?為控制溫室氣體排放、減緩氣候變化,保證社會(huì)資源消耗和環(huán)境負(fù)作用最小,我國(guó)政府承諾2020年單位GDP能耗相對(duì)2005年下降40%-45%。在碳減排既定目標(biāo)下,綠色供應(yīng)鏈成為當(dāng)前供應(yīng)鏈管理者關(guān)注的話題,但由于供應(yīng)鏈中的上下游企業(yè)往往分布于不同的區(qū)域,考慮跨區(qū)域不同地方政府差異性管制策略,關(guān)于碳排放權(quán)交易對(duì)減排效率及區(qū)域間公平的研究較少。本文考慮地方政府差異性管制策略,在以往的研究成果與實(shí)踐基礎(chǔ)上,基于碳排放權(quán)交易的跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)效率與公平,主要內(nèi)容包括:(1)企業(yè)自主減排情形下跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究。針對(duì)無(wú)碳排放限制與企業(yè)間無(wú)碳排放權(quán)交易的情形,分析了產(chǎn)品價(jià)格及單位產(chǎn)品碳減排率對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈上下游企業(yè)生產(chǎn)與自主碳減排決策的影響,基于Stackelberg博弈構(gòu)建了分散式與集中式企業(yè)自主減排綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型,通過(guò)對(duì)比分析,結(jié)論表明產(chǎn)品價(jià)格彈性系數(shù)、單位產(chǎn)品碳減排彈性系數(shù)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)收益有明顯影響,且供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)在完全合作時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈的收益和單位產(chǎn)品碳減排率都優(yōu)于分散式供應(yīng)鏈的收益和碳減排率。(2)碳排放權(quán)限制情形下跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究。針對(duì)有碳排放權(quán)限制及存在企業(yè)間碳排放權(quán)交易情形,分析了產(chǎn)品價(jià)格、單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量及碳交易價(jià)格對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈上下游企業(yè)生產(chǎn)與非自主碳減排決策的影響,基于Stackelberg博弈構(gòu)建了分散式與集中式企業(yè)非自主減排下綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型,通過(guò)對(duì)比分析,結(jié)論表明產(chǎn)品價(jià)格彈性系數(shù)、單位產(chǎn)品碳減排彈性系數(shù)、政府聯(lián)合制定的碳交易價(jià)格及政府懲罰因子對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)收益有明顯影響,且集中式策略中企業(yè)收益及碳減排彈性系數(shù)、政府懲罰力度對(duì)碳減排有明顯的影響,且供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)在完全合作時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈的收益和單位產(chǎn)品碳減排量都要優(yōu)于分散式供應(yīng)鏈的收益和碳減排量。(3)多政府參與下有碳排放權(quán)限制與交易的跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈公平研究。針對(duì)有碳排放權(quán)限制及存在企業(yè)間碳排放權(quán)交易情形,考慮跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈各地方政府差異性管制策略的公平問(wèn)題,以各企業(yè)所得碳排放權(quán)配額的不公平性最小為目標(biāo),分析了產(chǎn)品價(jià)格、單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量、碳交易價(jià)格及碳排放權(quán)配額對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈上下游企業(yè)生產(chǎn)與非自主碳減排決策的影響,基于Stackelberg博弈與二層規(guī)劃理論,構(gòu)建了分散式與集中式跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型,通過(guò)對(duì)比分析,結(jié)論表明產(chǎn)品價(jià)格彈性系數(shù)、單位產(chǎn)品碳減排彈性系數(shù)、碳排放權(quán)配額對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)收益及企業(yè)間公平有明顯影響。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of the global economy, greenhouse gas emissions have become the chief culprit of environmental climate deterioration. In order to control greenhouse gas emissions, mitigate climate change and ensure the minimum consumption of social resources and negative effects on the environment, Our government has promised to reduce the energy consumption per unit GDP in 2020 by 40% to 45% compared with 2005. Under the target of carbon emission reduction, green supply chain has become a topic of concern for current supply chain managers, but the upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain are often distributed in different regions. Considering the different regulatory strategies of different local governments across regions, there are few studies on the efficiency of carbon emissions trading and interregional fairness. This paper considers the different regulatory strategies of local governments, on the basis of previous research results and practices. The coordination efficiency and fairness of cross-regional green supply chain based on carbon emissions trading, including the coordination of cross-regional green supply chain under the circumstance of enterprises' autonomous emission reduction. This paper analyzes the influence of product price and carbon emission reduction rate per unit product on production and decision making of independent carbon reduction in upstream and downstream enterprises of supply chain. Based on Stackelberg game, the coordination model of decentralized and centralized enterprises' green supply chain with independent emission reduction is constructed. The conclusion shows that the price elasticity coefficient and carbon abatement elasticity coefficient of unit product have obvious influence on the profit of supply chain enterprise. Moreover, the profit of supply chain and the carbon emission reduction rate per unit product of supply chain are better than those of decentralized supply chain in the case of complete cooperation. The coordination of cross-regional green supply chain is studied under the condition of carbon emission right restriction. The limitation of carbon emission rights and the existence of trading of carbon emission rights among enterprises, The effects of product price, carbon emissions per unit product and carbon trading price on the production of upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain and the decision of involuntary carbon reduction are analyzed. Based on Stackelberg game, the green supply chain coordination model of decentralized and centralized enterprises under involuntary emission reduction is constructed. Through comparative analysis, it is concluded that the price elasticity coefficient and carbon reduction elasticity coefficient per unit product are obtained. The carbon trading price and the government penalty factor made jointly by the government have obvious influence on the profit of the supply chain enterprise, and the enterprise income and the elasticity coefficient of carbon emission reduction in the centralized strategy, the intensity of the government punishment has obvious influence on the carbon emission reduction. And when the supply chain enterprises cooperate fully, the profit of the supply chain and the carbon emission reduction per unit product are better than those of the decentralized supply chain and the carbon abatement amount. (3) under the multi-government participation, the trans-regional green supply with carbon emission right restriction and trading is better than that of the decentralized supply chain. Research on chain Equity. With regard to carbon emission rights restrictions and the existence of inter-firm carbon emissions trading, Considering the fairness of different control strategies of different local governments in cross-regional green supply chain, aiming at the minimum unfairness of carbon emission right quota earned by enterprises, this paper analyzes the product price and carbon emissions per unit product. The effect of carbon trading price and carbon emission right quota on the production and non-autonomous carbon emission reduction decision of upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain is discussed. Based on Stackelberg game and bilevel programming theory, a decentralized and centralized cross-regional green supply chain coordination model is constructed. Through comparative analysis, the conclusion shows that the price elasticity coefficient, carbon abatement elasticity coefficient of unit product and carbon emission right quota have obvious influence on the profit of supply chain enterprises and the equity among enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：X196;F274

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