發(fā)布時間：2018-05-28 12:11

  本文選題：因工傷殘 + 一次性工傷醫(yī)療補助金　； 參考：《重慶大學學報(社會科學版)》2017年06期

【摘要】：因工傷殘一次性工傷醫(yī)療補助金與傷殘就業(yè)補助金只是勞動能力受損后導致的工資收入損失的部分補償,以農(nóng)民工五至六級傷殘為例,一次性工傷醫(yī)療補助金與傷殘就業(yè)補助金對勞動力受損的工資收入平均替代不足50%。政策實踐應將一次性工傷醫(yī)療補助金與傷殘就業(yè)補助金視為傷殘待遇的一次性支付,待遇水平取決于傷殘年齡與受傷前工資水平。支付一次性工傷醫(yī)療補助金與傷殘就業(yè)補助金后,工傷復發(fā)或傷情加重后的醫(yī)療費用由工傷保險基金承擔。"合謀騙保"并非不當?shù)美?而是工傷者通過非法定通道獲取的應當利益。
[Abstract]:The one-time work-related injury medical benefits and the disability employment benefits due to work disability are only part of the compensation for the loss of wages resulting from the impairment of the working ability. Take the fifth to sixth degree disability of migrant workers as an example. The lump-sum injury medical benefit and the disability employment benefit replace less than 50% of the labor force's damaged wage income on average. The policy practice should regard the one-time injury medical benefit and the disability employment benefit as the one-time payment of the disability treatment, and the salary level depends on the disability age and the salary level before the injury. After the payment of one-time injury medical benefit and the disability employment benefit, the medical treatment expense after the injury relapse or the injury condition aggravation is borne by the industrial injury insurance fund. " Collusive insurance is not improper enrichment, but injury-injury through non-legal channels should gain benefits.
【作者單位】： 華東師范大學公共管理學院;
【基金】：教育部人文社會科學青年項目“行為導向下的工傷保險預防之激勵機制研究”(2012YJC840046)
【分類號】：F842.616
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本文編號：1946648