發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-01 22:34

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于博弈論視角的企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的外部防范與治理　出處：《蘭州大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 外部審計(jì) 管理層 博弈 監(jiān)督 財(cái)務(wù)舞弊

【摘要】：財(cái)務(wù)舞弊是指上市公司及其管理當(dāng)局為了達(dá)到他們的特殊目的,將對(duì)外公開(kāi)報(bào)出的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告進(jìn)行故意的錯(cuò)報(bào)、瞞報(bào)、修飾和虛假披露或者披露信息不完全,導(dǎo)致信息使用者做出錯(cuò)誤的決策,以謀取非法利益。資本市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)行程度是否良好直接受到在資本市場(chǎng)上進(jìn)行披露的信息質(zhì)量的影響。上市公司對(duì)外公開(kāi)披露的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告所傳達(dá)的信息對(duì)投資者、債權(quán)人等利益相關(guān)者的決策具有非常重要的影響。在過(guò)去的十多年間,我國(guó)上市公司及其管理者財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的現(xiàn)象接連不斷地發(fā)生,上市公司及其管理者通過(guò)進(jìn)行故意的錯(cuò)報(bào)、瞞報(bào)、修飾和虛假披露或者披露信息不完全,利用扭曲的財(cái)務(wù)信息誤導(dǎo)信息使用者做出錯(cuò)誤的決策,從而謀取非法利益。這些財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為不僅給公司或者企業(yè)的利益相關(guān)者帶來(lái)嚴(yán)重的損失,還擾亂了經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行的正常次序給社會(huì)造成了不良的后果,并且嚴(yán)重影響了資本市場(chǎng)的資源配置功能的發(fā)揮,破壞了“公平、公正、公開(kāi)”這一資本市場(chǎng)賴以生存的原則的運(yùn)行。鑒于這種情況,怎么樣有效防治和治理上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為,一直以來(lái)都被學(xué)術(shù)界重點(diǎn)對(duì)待。財(cái)務(wù)舞弊現(xiàn)象的頻繁發(fā)生暴露了我國(guó)目前的資本市場(chǎng)極度缺乏一套完善高效的外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制。既存在著監(jiān)管部門(mén)對(duì)上市公司及其管理當(dāng)局監(jiān)管不到位的情況,也說(shuō)明外部審計(jì)沒(méi)有充分發(fā)揮其經(jīng)濟(jì)警察的作用。 根據(jù)博弈論的定義,公司經(jīng)理層與外部審計(jì)之間,始終存在著博弈：為了自己個(gè)人和公司集體利益公司管理當(dāng)局有進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的動(dòng)機(jī),而承擔(dān)審計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師和其他審計(jì)人員的專業(yè)技能和經(jīng)驗(yàn)、職業(yè)素養(yǎng)以及努力程度對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的高低起到關(guān)鍵的作用,也會(huì)對(duì)公司管理者的行為策略有影響。在這個(gè)研究背景下,本論文以舞弊治理為落腳點(diǎn),基于一系列基本假設(shè),構(gòu)建關(guān)于上市公司管理者與外部審計(jì)的不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型。在不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型的基礎(chǔ)上,合理設(shè)計(jì)外部審計(jì)和管理層的效益函數(shù),并進(jìn)行納什均衡的求解,對(duì)該納什均衡解進(jìn)行分析與討論,分析公司管理者和外部審計(jì)的最優(yōu)選擇行為策略的影響因素,從而站在監(jiān)管部門(mén)和外部審計(jì)兩個(gè)角度提出有關(guān)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的外部防范與治理的建議。目前我國(guó)的上市公司內(nèi)部審計(jì)制度不完善,內(nèi)部治理也不合理,在這種情況下,可以通過(guò)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的外部防范與治理來(lái)降低上市公司管理者的舞弊可能性。
[Abstract]:Financial fraud refers to listed companies and their management in order to achieve their special purpose, the financial reports reported to the public are deliberately misreported, hidden, modified and false disclosure or disclosure of information is incomplete. Causes the information user to make the wrong decision. Whether the degree of operation of the capital market is good or not is directly affected by the quality of the information disclosed in the capital market. The decision of creditors and other stakeholders has a very important impact. In the past ten years, the phenomenon of financial fraud of listed companies and their managers in China has occurred one after another. Listed companies and their managers use distorted financial information to mislead information users by deliberately misreporting, concealing, modifying and false disclosing or disclosing incomplete information. These financial fraud not only brings serious losses to the stakeholders of the company or enterprise, but also disturbs the normal order of economic operation. And has seriously affected the capital market resources allocation function display, has destroyed "fair, just, open" this capital market survival principle movement. In view of this situation. How to effectively prevent and control the financial fraud of listed companies. The frequent occurrence of financial fraud has exposed the extreme lack of a set of perfect and efficient external supervision mechanism in China's capital market. Inadequate regulatory oversight by management. Also shows that the external audit does not give full play to its economic police role. According to the definition of game theory, there is always a game between the company manager and external audit: the corporate management has the motive of financial fraud for its own personal and corporate collective interests. The professional skills and experience, professional accomplishment and the degree of effort of the CPA and other auditors who undertake the audit business play a key role in the audit quality. In this research background, this paper takes fraud governance as the foothold, based on a series of basic assumptions. Based on the incomplete information dynamic game model of listed company managers and external audit, the benefit function of external audit and management is designed reasonably. The solution of Nash equilibrium is analyzed and discussed, and the influencing factors of optimal choice behavior strategy of managers and external audit are analyzed. From the perspective of supervision and external audit, this paper puts forward some suggestions on external prevention and governance of financial fraud. At present, the internal audit system of listed companies in our country is not perfect, and the internal governance is not reasonable. In this case, the external prevention and governance of financial fraud can reduce the possibility of fraud of listed company managers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳國(guó)輝;張金松;;上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊治理的博弈論研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問(wèn)題研究;2008年01期

2 張金松;陳國(guó)輝;;注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師與上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊博弈的審計(jì)收費(fèi)——來(lái)自中國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問(wèn)題研究;2011年02期

3 杜興強(qiáng);公司治理演進(jìn)與會(huì)計(jì)信息披露監(jiān)管——博弈分析與歷史證據(jù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2004年09期

4 鄒晶;陳莉;劉慧明;;舞弊審計(jì)失敗的原因分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2007年02期

5 朱國(guó)泓;上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的二元治理——激勵(lì)優(yōu)化與會(huì)計(jì)控制強(qiáng)化[J];管理世界;2001年04期

6 余玉苗;中國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的初步分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)評(píng)論;2001年03期

7 李若山,譚菊芳,葉奕明,洪劍峭;論國(guó)際法務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)的需求與供給──兼論法務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)與新《會(huì)計(jì)法》的關(guān)系[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2000年11期

8 劉峰;制度安排與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量——紅光實(shí)業(yè)的案例分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2001年07期

9 馮萌 ,李若山 ,蔣衛(wèi)平 ,楊晨光;從安然事件看美國(guó)法務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)的訴訟支持[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2003年01期

10 姚海鑫 ,尹波 ,李正;關(guān)于上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管的不完全信息博弈分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2003年05期

，

本文編號(hào)：1366519