發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-04 19:31

  本文選題：消費(fèi)者行為 + 回購(gòu)契約��； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2015年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著電子商務(wù)在全球快速發(fā)展,電子商務(wù)逐漸成為了人們所熱衷的消費(fèi)方式之一,其模式和運(yùn)用呈現(xiàn)出更加靈活多樣的狀態(tài)。在全球供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)中,傳統(tǒng)的交易模式逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變成電子商務(wù)交易模式。此外,現(xiàn)在學(xué)術(shù)界研究了企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)領(lǐng)域中許多新的研究問(wèn)題包括日益競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)的銷(xiāo)售模式所產(chǎn)生的電子商務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈,例如消費(fèi)者行為問(wèn)題。為了應(yīng)對(duì)該形勢(shì)下的挑戰(zhàn),考慮消費(fèi)者行為對(duì)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的影響,圍繞相關(guān)問(wèn)題研究,如供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈分析、供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效水平如何及各種契約協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制等,并應(yīng)用市場(chǎng)學(xué)等相關(guān)理論和方法,靜態(tài)博弈理論、動(dòng)態(tài)博弈理論、最優(yōu)化分析,研究電子商務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效水平和運(yùn)營(yíng)管理中發(fā)現(xiàn)新的機(jī)制,為供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)提出指導(dǎo)性和建設(shè)性的意見(jiàn)和理論依據(jù)。具體來(lái)講,本文主要研究了以下幾個(gè)方面的內(nèi)容1.電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下考慮消費(fèi)者行為和服務(wù)水平的契約協(xié)調(diào)與優(yōu)化策略研究(1)基于服務(wù)水平的drop-shipping收益共享契約模型及優(yōu)化策略研究在由一個(gè)供應(yīng)商和一個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商組成的同時(shí)以追求利潤(rùn)最大化和服務(wù)水平最大化為目的的drop-shipping供應(yīng)鏈中,探討了考慮服務(wù)水平情況下的收益共享契約協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。收益共享契約在某些條件下,使供應(yīng)鏈各成員及供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)達(dá)到最大化,實(shí)現(xiàn)了完美契約協(xié)調(diào)。(2)考慮消費(fèi)者退貨決策的兩階段制造商回購(gòu)策略研究結(jié)合C2B與B2C電子商務(wù)模式的特點(diǎn),構(gòu)建出產(chǎn)品生命周期中存在C2B-B2C兩階段電子商務(wù)模式的供應(yīng)鏈模型,分析第一階段C2B供應(yīng)鏈中退貨補(bǔ)償價(jià)格對(duì)退貨量的影響以及對(duì)第二階段B2C供應(yīng)鏈銷(xiāo)量、利潤(rùn)的影響,并研究和設(shè)計(jì)了相應(yīng)制造商回購(gòu)合同來(lái)進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào),并通過(guò)算例驗(yàn)證了由兩階段電子商務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈中零售商制定退貨補(bǔ)償價(jià)格對(duì)兩階段供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)的影響以及制造商回購(gòu)合同對(duì)零售商退貨補(bǔ)償價(jià)格與兩階段供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)的影響,達(dá)到了Pareto最優(yōu)。(3)聯(lián)合契約下三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找婀蚕?回購(gòu)契約協(xié)調(diào)及優(yōu)化策略在由制造商、分銷(xiāo)商和零售商組成的三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈中,構(gòu)建了三級(jí)易逝品供應(yīng)鏈報(bào)童模型。在三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈中的兩個(gè)上下游企業(yè)交易過(guò)程中采用了不同的契約類(lèi)型,以及如何設(shè)計(jì)收益共享-回購(gòu)契約機(jī)制來(lái)協(xié)調(diào),使整體供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)及各自供應(yīng)鏈成員利潤(rùn)達(dá)到最大,來(lái)達(dá)到完美契約協(xié)調(diào)。2.消費(fèi)者行為與企業(yè)信息安全行為之間的動(dòng)態(tài)優(yōu)化策略研究從企業(yè)信息安全問(wèn)題的實(shí)際出發(fā),運(yùn)用演化博弈理論建立了企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者的演化博弈模型。嘗試從公眾參與的角度分析了大數(shù)據(jù)背景下企業(yè)信息安全投資和消費(fèi)者之間策略選擇和交互行為的影響,通過(guò)雙方均衡狀態(tài),總結(jié)出系統(tǒng)兩種模式:良好狀態(tài)模式(購(gòu)買(mǎi),投資)和不良狀態(tài)模式(不購(gòu)買(mǎi),不投資),而這種狀態(tài)不利于企業(yè)自身發(fā)展,不利于整個(gè)社會(huì)的福利。因此,要跳出不良狀態(tài),就要尋求優(yōu)化企業(yè)信息安全,使消費(fèi)者和企業(yè)達(dá)到雙贏的結(jié)果。3.基于“供應(yīng)鏈聲譽(yù)”供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)動(dòng)態(tài)優(yōu)化決策研究利用微分對(duì)策理論研究并構(gòu)建了單個(gè)供應(yīng)商和單個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈微分對(duì)策動(dòng)態(tài)模型的優(yōu)化問(wèn)題,運(yùn)用漢密爾頓-雅可比-貝爾曼方程求出供應(yīng)商和網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商在Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主從博弈及協(xié)同合作博弈條件下的最優(yōu)策略,并對(duì)此三種博弈結(jié)構(gòu)下的反饋均衡結(jié)果進(jìn)行了比較。研究結(jié)果顯示,協(xié)同合作博弈情形下的系統(tǒng)收益、參與雙方的收益水平要優(yōu)于Nash非合作、Stackelberg博弈情形下的收益水平;在Stackelberg博弈情形下,網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商的激勵(lì)因子是供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中的一種協(xié)調(diào)和激勵(lì)機(jī)制,可以提高供應(yīng)鏈各自成員以及整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的收益。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of e-commerce in the world, e-commerce has gradually become one of the consuming ways people are keen on. Its mode and application are more flexible and diverse. In the global supply chain network, the traditional trading mode has gradually changed into e-commerce trading mode. In addition, the academic circle has now studied the field of business operation. Many new research issues include the e-business supply chain, such as consumer behavior, produced by the increasingly competitive market and the marketing model of the enterprise. In response to the challenges in the situation, the impact of consumer behavior on corporate profits is considered, such as the dynamic game analysis of enterprises in the supply chain, and the supply chain. The performance level and various contract coordination mechanisms, and the application of market science and other related theories and methods, static game theory, dynamic game theory, optimization analysis, the study of the performance level of e-commerce supply chain and the discovery of new mechanisms in operation management, to provide guidance and constructive suggestions and theoretical basis for supply chain enterprises. This paper mainly studies the following aspects: 1. research on the contract coordination and optimization strategy considering consumer behavior and service level in e-business environment (1) the drop-shipping revenue sharing contract model and optimization strategy based on service level are made up of a supplier and a network retailer. In the drop-shipping supply chain, which aims at maximizing profit and maximizing the service level, the problem of revenue sharing contract coordination under the condition of service level is discussed. Under some conditions, the income sharing contract maximizes the overall profit of the supply chain and supply chain, and realizes the perfect contract coordination. (2) considering the consumer retreat. The two stage manufacturer repurchase strategy study in the two stage of cargo decision-making, combined with the characteristics of C2B and B2C e-business model, constructs a supply chain model in the product life cycle of the existence of the two stage e-commerce model in the product life cycle, analyzes the response of the return compensation price to the return volume in the first stage of the C2B supply chain, and the sales of the second stage B2C supply chain, and the profit. It also studies and designs the corresponding manufacturer repurchase contract to coordinate, and proves the effect of the retailer's return compensation price on the overall profit of the two stage supply chain in the two stage e-commerce supply chain as well as the manufacturer repo contract on the retailer's return compensation price and the overall profit of the two stage supply chain through an example. The effect is Pareto optimal. (3) the three level supply chain repurchase contract coordination and optimization strategy under the joint contract in the three level supply chain composed of manufacturers, distributors and retailers, the three perishable supply chain newsboy model is constructed. In the three level supply chain, two upstream and downstream enterprises are used in the transaction process. The type of contract and how to coordinate the profit sharing and repurchase contract mechanism to make the profit of the whole supply chain and the profit of each member of the supply chain reach the maximum, to achieve the perfect contract coordination between the.2. consumer behavior and the enterprise information security behavior. The evolution game model of enterprise and consumer is established by the theory of game theory. From the perspective of public participation, this paper tries to analyze the influence of enterprise information security investment and consumer strategy selection and interaction behavior under the large data background. Through the equilibrium state of both parties, it summarizes the two modes of the system: good state model (purchase, investment) and bad shape. State mode (no purchase, no investment), and this state is not conducive to the development of the enterprise itself, is not conducive to the welfare of the whole society. Therefore, to jump out of the bad state, we should seek to optimize the information security of the enterprise and make the consumer and the enterprise achieve a win-win result.3. based on the "supply chain sound reputation" supply chain system dynamic optimization decision making use of differential pairs. The strategy theory studies and constructs the optimization problem of the dynamic model of the two level supply chain differential game with a single supplier and a single network retailer, and uses the Hamilton Jacobi Behrman equation to find out the optimal strategy of the supplier and the network retailer in the Nash non cooperative game, the Stackelberg master-slave game and the cooperative game. The results of the feedback equilibrium under the three game structures are compared. The results show that the income level of the system is better than that of the Nash non cooperation and the Stackelberg game. In the case of Stackelberg game, the incentive factor of the network retailer is the supply chain system. A coordination and incentive mechanism can improve the revenue of each member of the supply chain and the entire supply chain system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274
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本文編號(hào)：1844371