發(fā)布時間：2018-03-20 11:46

  本文選題：不當解雇賠償　切入點：合作博弈　出處：《中國人力資源開發(fā)》2017年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：在中國,不當解雇引起的賠償金爭議日益增多。本文首先對美、英、法、德四國相關規(guī)制進行比較研究,分析并總結出不當解雇賠償需經(jīng)勞雇雙方博弈來確定賠償責任和賠償標準的內在運行機制。以諾基亞(蘇州)不當解雇賠償案例為引導,基于一個合作博弈分析,得出賠償金數(shù)額的大小受勞雇雙方賠償金談判的風險偏好影響等結論。
[Abstract]:In China, disputes over compensation caused by improper dismissal are increasing day by day. This paper first makes a comparative study of the relevant regulations of the United States, Britain, France and Germany. This paper analyzes and summarizes the inherent operating mechanism of the compensation for improper dismissal based on the game between labor and employee. Based on the analysis of a cooperative game, this paper takes the case of improper dismissal compensation in Suzhou as the guide. It is concluded that the amount of compensation is influenced by the risk preference in the negotiation of compensation.
【作者單位】： 北京物資學院勞動科學與法律學院;
【分類號】：D922.52
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本文編號：1638939