發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-20 03:08

  本文選題：土地生財(cái)模式 + 信號(hào)傳遞��； 參考：《中共中央黨�！�2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：分稅制改革后，地方政府財(cái)權(quán)與事權(quán)不匹配，地方政府財(cái)政狀況不佳，主要依靠中央政府的轉(zhuǎn)移支付和稅收返還維持財(cái)政收支平衡，沒(méi)有余力進(jìn)行公共投資。但是隨著房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的不斷發(fā)展，土地生財(cái)模式成為地方政府財(cái)政收入的重要支柱。2011年在審計(jì)部門(mén)的調(diào)查下地方政府龐大的債務(wù)規(guī)模逐步顯露出來(lái)，引發(fā)了地方債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的擔(dān)憂(yōu)。 本文首先通過(guò)對(duì)地方債務(wù)的發(fā)展歷程進(jìn)行梳理發(fā)現(xiàn)地方政府存在過(guò)度負(fù)債進(jìn)行公共投資的強(qiáng)烈偏好。隨后對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)于地方政府債務(wù)的研究論述和現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析歸納，得到本文的研究結(jié)論：地方政府巨額負(fù)債的深層次原因是地方政績(jī)考核體系和財(cái)源支持的結(jié)果，銀行業(yè)起到了推波助瀾的作用。我國(guó)實(shí)行集權(quán)式的行政管理體制，因此分析地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要上升到我國(guó)政府總體債務(wù)上進(jìn)行定量分析，總體上說(shuō)地方債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可控，但是局部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、短期風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很高。隨著中央政府對(duì)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)采取了史上最嚴(yán)格的宏觀調(diào)控，繼續(xù)實(shí)行現(xiàn)有的土地生財(cái)模式不可持續(xù)，地方本級(jí)財(cái)政收入以及土地出讓收入的不穩(wěn)定性加劇，中央政府面臨著兜底風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 本文根據(jù)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：地方政府債務(wù)的深層次原因是政績(jī)考核體系和土地生財(cái)模式共同作用的結(jié)果。因此本文從政治體制改革、財(cái)政體制改革、金融體制改革、土地生財(cái)模式改革四方面出發(fā)，，通過(guò)四位一體的改革使地方政府舉債投資沖動(dòng)和超前財(cái)源的支撐得到有效抑制，使地方政府舉債的邊際成本和邊際收益相等，實(shí)現(xiàn)當(dāng)?shù)鼐用竦母＠�最大化�?br/>[Abstract]:After the reform of the tax sharing system, the local government's financial power and power are not matched, the local government's financial situation is not good, it mainly depends on the central government's transfer payment and tax return to maintain the balance of fiscal revenue and expenditure, and there is no Yu Li for public investment. However, with the development of real estate industry, land revenue model has become an important pillar of local government revenue. In 2011, the huge debt scale of local government gradually revealed under the audit department survey, which caused local debt risk concern. Firstly, this paper finds out that the local government has a strong preference for excessive debt for public investment by combing the development process of local debt. Then this paper analyzes and summarizes the domestic and foreign research on the local government debt, and obtains the conclusion of this paper: the deep reason of the local government's huge debt is the result of the local government performance assessment system and the financial support. The banking sector has played a role in fuelling the flames. Our country implements the centralized administrative management system, therefore, the analysis of the local government debt risk should rise to the overall government debt quantitative analysis, generally speaking, the local debt risk is controllable, but the local risk, short-term risk is very high. As the central government has adopted the most stringent macro-control in the history of the real estate industry, the continuation of the existing land revenue generation model is not sustainable, and the instability of local fiscal revenues at the local level and the income from land sales has increased. The central government is at risk. According to the research, this paper finds that the deep reason of the local government debt is the result of the joint action of the political achievement appraisal system and the land generating money model. Therefore, this article from the political system reform, the financial system reform, the land income pattern reform four aspects, through the four-in-one reform, causes the local government to borrow the loan investment impulse and the support of the leading finance source to obtain the effective suppression. The marginal cost and marginal income of local government borrowing are equal and the welfare of local residents is maximized.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中共中央黨校
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F812.5;F301

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