發(fā)布時間：2018-03-24 22:19

  本文選題：利他　切入點：法律干預(yù)　出處：《國家檢察官學(xué)院學(xué)報》2017年02期

【摘要】：作為一項以限制個人自由的方式來實現(xiàn)對他人救助的干預(yù)模式,利他救助法律干預(yù)亟待解決的是自身正當(dāng)性的證成。從必要性的層面來看,利他行為在缺少外在干預(yù)的情況下存在自洽性不足的缺憾。以多元主義的視角來看,自由僅是眾多價值中的一項,在利他救助情境下并不具有優(yōu)越性。從充分性的層面來看,利他救助能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)對基本人權(quán)的保障,實施救助不僅是道德義務(wù)同樣可以劃歸到法定義務(wù)的體系當(dāng)中。同時,利他救助的法律干預(yù)有助于公共利益的確認(rèn)和維護(hù),實現(xiàn)公眾對良好社會的期許。
[Abstract]:As a mode of intervention to help others by restricting individual freedom, the legal intervention of altruistic assistance needs to be solved as evidence of its own legitimacy. From the point of view of necessity, In the absence of external intervention, altruistic behavior lacks self-consistency. From the perspective of pluralism, freedom is only one of many values, and it is not superior in altruistic situations. Altruistic assistance can guarantee the basic human rights, the implementation of which is not only a moral obligation, but also a system of legal obligations. At the same time, the legal intervention of altruistic assistance is helpful to the recognition and maintenance of public interest. Realize the public's expectation of a good society.
【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)理論法學(xué)研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社會科學(xué)重點研究基地重大項目“法治中國的理論與實踐研究”(14JJD820002)的階段性成果
【分類號】：D922.182
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本文編號：1660266