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  本文關鍵詞：上市公司違規(guī)處罰后會提高會計信息質(zhì)量嗎？　出處：《南京大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 公司違規(guī) 處罰 會計信息質(zhì)量

【摘要】：資本市場本質(zhì)上是一個信息市場,高質(zhì)量的信息披露是保障資本市場有效運轉的基石。然而近年來我國證券市場上市公司的違規(guī)行為,尤其是信息披露違規(guī)行為頻頻出現(xiàn)、屢禁不止,不僅給廣大投資者為帶來了巨大的利益損失,而且對我國證券市場的穩(wěn)定和健康發(fā)展構成很大威脅。證監(jiān)會和交易所根據(jù)我國證券市場發(fā)展的實際狀況并借鑒發(fā)達國家資本市場的經(jīng)驗,頒布并實施了一系列信息披露制度及監(jiān)管制度,以規(guī)范上市公司的信息披露,并對違規(guī)公司給予處罰。違規(guī)公司在受到處罰后,可能會就此改過自新,積極提高會計信息質(zhì)量；也有可能無視所受的處罰,為了實現(xiàn)特定利益繼續(xù)知法犯法。 基于此背景,本文選取了2000～2009年間滬深兩市462次違規(guī)處罰事件,涉及290家上市公司作為研究對象,分析違規(guī)上市公司在受罰前后會計信息質(zhì)量的變化情況,從而探討監(jiān)管機構的處罰效果以及可能對處罰效果造成影響的相關因素。經(jīng)過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)監(jiān)管機構的處罰能刺激公司提高信息披露水平,為投資者提供更為充分透明和客觀真實的會計信息,有一定程度的效果。(2)適當加大處罰力度可使處罰效果更加明顯。(3)若公司前一年處于虧損狀態(tài),扭虧為盈的動機會使得處罰效果有所折扣,但在重罰下公司仍會以“改正錯誤”——即提高信息質(zhì)量為首要任務。(4)我國監(jiān)管機構存在選擇性執(zhí)法的現(xiàn)象,但不公平的處罰并不能刺激公司改正錯誤,只有根據(jù)公司違規(guī)嚴重程度給予相應程度的處罰措施,才能促使公司從此次處罰中得到教訓并在之后積極改正錯誤,為投資者提供高質(zhì)量的會計信息。(5)資本市場可以識別違規(guī)企業(yè)的糾錯行為,若公司受處罰后“知錯不改”,將使投資者信心喪失并“用腳投票”,從而導致股票收益率大幅下跌；只有積極改正錯誤的態(tài)度能贏得投資者的信心,維護公司在市場中的形象和威信。本文對監(jiān)管機構處罰效果及其影響因素的研究,將有助于理解證券市場現(xiàn)有監(jiān)管機制的不足,并進一步完善我國信息披露理論和監(jiān)管理論,為證券監(jiān)管的發(fā)展提供理論參考。
[Abstract]:The capital market is essentially an information market, and high quality information disclosure is the cornerstone of ensuring the effective operation of the capital market. However, in recent years, the listed companies in the stock market of our country have violated the regulations. In particular, the frequent occurrence of information disclosure violations, repeated prohibitions, not only to the vast number of investors for the huge loss of interests. Moreover, it poses a great threat to the stability and healthy development of China's securities market. According to the actual situation of the development of China's securities market and the experience of developed countries' capital markets, the Securities Regulatory Commission and the Stock Exchange will learn from the experience of the developed countries. Promulgated and implemented a series of information disclosure system and supervision system to regulate the information disclosure of listed companies and to punish the illegal companies. Actively improve the quality of accounting information; It is also possible to ignore the punishment and continue to break the law in order to achieve specific interests. Based on this background, this paper selects 462 illegal punishment events in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2000 and 2009, involving 290 listed companies as the research object. Analyze the changes of accounting information quality before and after the punishment of the listed companies in violation of the regulations. In order to explore the regulatory effect of punishment and possible impact on the effect of the relevant factors. After the study found that the punishment of the regulatory body can stimulate companies to improve the level of information disclosure. To provide investors with more transparent and objective accounting information, there is a certain degree of effect. 2) appropriate increase in penalties can make the punishment more obvious. 3) if the company is in a state of loss in the previous year. The motive of turning losses into profits will make the penalty effect less effective, but companies will still take "correcting mistakes"-that is, improving the quality of information as the primary task-under heavy penalties.) there is a phenomenon of selective enforcement by our country's regulators. But the unfair punishment can not stimulate the company to correct the mistakes, only according to the severity of the company violations to give the corresponding degree of punishment measures, in order to encourage the company to learn from the punishment and to actively correct the mistakes afterwards. Provide high quality accounting information for investors.) the capital market can identify the error-correcting behavior of illegal enterprises. If the company is punished, it will make investors lose their confidence and vote with their feet. As a result, the stock yield fell sharply; Only positive attitude to correct mistakes can win the confidence of investors and maintain the image and prestige of the company in the market. It will be helpful to understand the shortcomings of the existing regulatory mechanism in the securities market, and further improve the theory of information disclosure and supervision in China, and provide a theoretical reference for the development of securities regulation.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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本文編號：1357689