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  本文選題：過度投資 + 自由現(xiàn)金流��； 參考：《遼寧大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：2008年金融危機(jī)以來,由于國家的“4萬億”計(jì)劃基本上大部分都用來投入在大型基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)上,如鋼鐵、煤炭、道路等行業(yè),許多都是重復(fù)投資和重復(fù)建設(shè),這就致使了產(chǎn)能過剩,利潤低下,資本回報率不高,所以投資問題也使我國的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展陷入了一個艱難的境地。 當(dāng)前伴隨著中國投資環(huán)境變化,上市公司業(yè)務(wù)的復(fù)雜多重性和財務(wù)決策的重要性再加上股東與公司高管之間的矛盾沖突,使公司的投資行為也可能開始離企業(yè)價值最大化的目標(biāo)漸行漸遠(yuǎn),投資過熱現(xiàn)象不僅對公司的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展是一個巨大的損害,還影響了整個中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展線路和社會的發(fā)展。 從一些西方學(xué)者研究過度投資的文獻(xiàn)中可以看出,對于約束企業(yè)過度投資的方法主要有：改善上市公司的治理制度、較多的發(fā)放股利而不留存太多還有就是通過負(fù)債或者說短期負(fù)債的方式來籌集資金。因?yàn)橹袊�的股市是通過改制,有許多上市公司都是從以前的國有企業(yè)改革而來,股利也不是隨便發(fā)放的,這些制約因素致使股權(quán)支付并不多,而上市公司的復(fù)雜性也使公司治理比較困難不太好掌握而難以達(dá)成具體的成效。 因此,本文主要選擇負(fù)債這一因素來進(jìn)一步研究。首先通過閱讀大量的文獻(xiàn)資料等把握住研究的方向和有一個總體的思路,也是一個學(xué)習(xí)和借鑒。接下來在理論部分主要是介紹了如何來衡量過度投資的程度和負(fù)債的相機(jī)治理機(jī)制等,為下一部‘分的實(shí)證分析打下基礎(chǔ)。在實(shí)證部分主要是對我國上市公司的投資過熱現(xiàn)象是否存在及產(chǎn)生這種現(xiàn)象的原因進(jìn)行分析驗(yàn)證,然后在當(dāng)今中國的上市資本環(huán)境下的舉借負(fù)債是否對過度投資有約束作用做了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)與分析,因?yàn)樵诓煌�的行業(yè)中再加上每個公司的債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)也不同,所以在這些不同的約束條件下負(fù)債的治理就會有不同的表現(xiàn)和結(jié)果,這樣在分析時分別考慮了影響企業(yè)過度投資問題的因素,如自由現(xiàn)金流的多少還有負(fù)債的期限比例的大小等。最后又結(jié)合造成投資過熱現(xiàn)象的原因從不同的角度又提出了比較有針對性的建議。
[Abstract]:Since the 2008 financial crisis, most of the country's "4 trillion" plans have been spent on large-scale infrastructure, such as steel, coal, roads, and so on. This leads to overcapacity, low profits and low return on capital, so the investment problem also makes the economic development of our country into a difficult situation. At present, with the change of investment environment in China, the complexity and multiplicity of the business of listed companies and the importance of financial decisions, in addition to the contradictions between shareholders and company executives, The investment behavior of the company may also begin to run away from the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise. The overheating of investment is not only a great harm to the long-term development of the company, but also affects the economic development line and the social development of the whole China. As can be seen from the literature on overinvestment by some western scholars, the main ways to restrain overinvestment of enterprises are: to improve the governance system of listed companies, More dividends are paid without too much left and funds are raised through liabilities or short-term liabilities. Because China's stock market is through restructuring, many listed companies have come from the previous reform of state-owned enterprises, and dividends are not issued casually. These constraints result in a small amount of equity payments. The complexity of listed companies also makes corporate governance difficult to grasp and achieve concrete results. Therefore, this article mainly chooses the debt this one factor to further study. First of all, by reading a large amount of literature and other materials to grasp the direction of the study and have a general idea, but also a learning and reference. Then in the theoretical part it mainly introduces how to measure the degree of overinvestment and the camera governance mechanism of debt so as to lay the foundation for the next part of the empirical analysis. In the empirical part, it mainly analyzes whether the overheated investment of listed companies in our country exists and the reasons for this phenomenon. Then, in the current Chinese listed capital environment, whether the borrowing liabilities have a constraint on overinvestment is empirically tested and analyzed, because the debt maturity structure of each company is different in different industries. Therefore, under these different constraint conditions, the governance of liabilities will have different performance and results. In this way, the factors that affect the overinvestment of enterprises are taken into account in the analysis. Such as the amount of free cash flow and the size of the maturity ratio of the debt, and so on. Finally, combined with the causes of overheating of investment, some suggestions are put forward from different angles.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：2054593