發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-15 16:46

  本文選題：新型城鎮(zhèn)化 + 環(huán)境規(guī)制�。� 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：目前我國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)化率已突破50%,進(jìn)入到以城市型社會(huì)為主體的新時(shí)代。而伴隨著城鎮(zhèn)化、工業(yè)化的迅速發(fā)展,自然資源過度消耗、溫室效應(yīng)、沙漠化等環(huán)境問題日趨突出,城鎮(zhèn)發(fā)展與資源能源利用、環(huán)境維護(hù)之間的矛盾凸現(xiàn)。新型城鎮(zhèn)化是我國(guó)現(xiàn)代化建設(shè)的歷史任務(wù),《國(guó)家新型城鎮(zhèn)化規(guī)劃(2014-2020年)》中提出要把生態(tài)文明理念全面融入城鎮(zhèn)化進(jìn)程,著力推進(jìn)綠色發(fā)展、循環(huán)發(fā)展、低碳發(fā)展。從環(huán)境污染的來源看,工業(yè)污染是我國(guó)環(huán)境污染的主要來源,近年來頻發(fā)的惡性環(huán)境污染事故,表明眾多企業(yè)正在環(huán)境資源上展開“逐底競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”,企業(yè)環(huán)境責(zé)任的缺失引發(fā)了廣泛的社會(huì)擔(dān)憂。盡管我國(guó)已經(jīng)建立起比較完備的法律法規(guī)體系,但總體來看,環(huán)境污染仍然沒有得到有效的控制,某種程度上還呈現(xiàn)出不斷惡化的趨勢(shì)。因此,如何結(jié)合我國(guó)新型城鎮(zhèn)化建設(shè)的背景,建立有效的環(huán)境規(guī)制制度,引導(dǎo)企業(yè)自覺進(jìn)行環(huán)境管理,以實(shí)現(xiàn)生態(tài)環(huán)境的根本改善,保障經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,是目前迫切需要研究解決的課題。本研究首先構(gòu)建環(huán)境規(guī)制的博弈方參與模型,運(yùn)用演化博弈等工具從理論層面分析政府、企業(yè)、公眾的策略性行為。緊接著立足于企業(yè)微觀視角,通過對(duì)企業(yè)年報(bào)、社會(huì)責(zé)任報(bào)告、環(huán)境報(bào)告、可持續(xù)發(fā)展報(bào)告等信息的搜集,揭示企業(yè)的環(huán)境信息披露現(xiàn)狀,并借助于典型案例,剖析企業(yè)環(huán)境管理的動(dòng)機(jī),探討對(duì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行環(huán)境規(guī)制的必要性。在對(duì)我國(guó)環(huán)境規(guī)制政策體系進(jìn)行梳理的基礎(chǔ)上,參照OECD環(huán)境政策分類方法,將我國(guó)的1400余項(xiàng)環(huán)境規(guī)制政策進(jìn)行分類,并選取典型的環(huán)境規(guī)制政策,如污染治理投資、能效標(biāo)識(shí)、資源稅、排污費(fèi)“費(fèi)改稅”進(jìn)行實(shí)施效果評(píng)價(jià),力求挖掘出目前環(huán)境規(guī)制政策在制定、執(zhí)行中出現(xiàn)的主要問題。文章進(jìn)一步借鑒了英國(guó)小城鎮(zhèn)發(fā)展中的環(huán)保經(jīng)驗(yàn)以及OECD國(guó)家的環(huán)境信息數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)建設(shè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在以上分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了新型城鎮(zhèn)化背景下完善企業(yè)環(huán)境規(guī)制體系的建議。主要的研究結(jié)論有以下四點(diǎn)：第一,演化博弈模型的系統(tǒng)動(dòng)態(tài)均衡結(jié)果顯示,企業(yè)總是傾向于從利益出發(fā),選擇超標(biāo)排放,政府也有很大的傾向選擇不進(jìn)行環(huán)境規(guī)制,在公眾的舉報(bào)成本高于舉報(bào)成功的效用改善時(shí),公眾的演化穩(wěn)定策略為不舉報(bào)。加大對(duì)企業(yè)超標(biāo)排放的處罰力度,盡可能減少政府的檢查成本,增加環(huán)境破壞所可能帶來的政府公眾形象損失,可以降低政府不作為的可能。增加公眾舉報(bào)成功后預(yù)期效用的改善,減少公眾的舉報(bào)成本,是促使公眾參與到對(duì)企業(yè)行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的重要條件。第二,目前我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司的環(huán)境信息披露仍是以強(qiáng)制性披露為主,企業(yè)自覺進(jìn)行環(huán)境管理和自愿性信息披露的比例較低；高污染企業(yè)的環(huán)境信息披露指數(shù)顯著高于非污染企業(yè)；多渠道披露有助于提升企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的內(nèi)容和質(zhì)量；制造類上市公司針對(duì)環(huán)保補(bǔ)助的信息披露并不充分,資金去向和使用效果難以觀測(cè)。第三,典型案例分析結(jié)果顯示,即使對(duì)于行業(yè)的領(lǐng)頭羊,下大力氣提高環(huán)境績(jī)效仍然是比較“奢侈”的事情。公司較好的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效更多地是得益于公司存在較好的市場(chǎng)機(jī)遇和技術(shù)水平,難以看到環(huán)境績(jī)效對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的直接促進(jìn)。這也正是導(dǎo)致企業(yè)在很大程度上難以自覺地進(jìn)行環(huán)境管理,促進(jìn)環(huán)境績(jī)效提升的原因。第四,工業(yè)污染治理投資、能效標(biāo)識(shí)、資源稅、排污費(fèi)等多項(xiàng)環(huán)境規(guī)制政策的實(shí)施效果不盡理想。工業(yè)治污投資對(duì)污染物排放能起到一定的遏制作用,但工業(yè)治污投資的增加僅能帶來污染物排放量以很低的比例減少,且存在一定的起效期,污染產(chǎn)生后進(jìn)行治理,投資花費(fèi)多,治理難度大。能效標(biāo)識(shí)的市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)向效果評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)果顯示,消費(fèi)者并非對(duì)能效等級(jí)最高的家電產(chǎn)品情有獨(dú)鐘,由于價(jià)格等因素的限制,消費(fèi)者會(huì)選擇能效等級(jí)較高的家電產(chǎn)品。在消費(fèi)者選擇了不同等級(jí)的家電產(chǎn)品后,消費(fèi)者滿意度并無(wú)明顯差異,能效等級(jí)并非是影響消費(fèi)者選擇和滿意度的顯著因素。由于能效標(biāo)識(shí)對(duì)節(jié)能產(chǎn)品的消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)“拉力”不足,生產(chǎn)商生產(chǎn)節(jié)能產(chǎn)品的動(dòng)力也會(huì)相應(yīng)受挫。運(yùn)用事件研究法分析煤炭資源稅改革的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng),發(fā)現(xiàn)在資源價(jià)格下降階段,從價(jià)定率的計(jì)征方式會(huì)減少企業(yè)稅收負(fù)擔(dān),對(duì)資源開采類企業(yè)市值產(chǎn)生正面影響；單位稅額的增加會(huì)對(duì)資源開采類企業(yè)市值產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響；相比較文件頒布日,企業(yè)市值會(huì)在文件執(zhí)行日產(chǎn)生更明顯的波動(dòng)。煤炭資源稅改革文件的發(fā)布和實(shí)施僅有極短的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng),煤炭資源稅改革很大程度上是為了減輕資源開采類企業(yè)的稅收負(fù)擔(dān)。我國(guó)排污費(fèi)的征收并沒有起到顯著的污染物減排效果,僅有排污費(fèi)對(duì)工業(yè)煙(粉)塵的排放量作用效果為負(fù),但并未通過顯著性檢驗(yàn)。排污費(fèi)對(duì)于COD的排放量沒有起到應(yīng)有的抑制作用,反而會(huì)顯著地增加COD的排放量；排污費(fèi)也會(huì)引起S02排放量的增加,但并未通過顯著性檢驗(yàn)。我國(guó)擬開征的環(huán)境保護(hù)稅與原有排污費(fèi)相比,征收標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和污染物種類并無(wú)變化,此次排污費(fèi)的改革實(shí)質(zhì)上是要進(jìn)行由費(fèi)向稅的平移。本研究認(rèn)為改革后的環(huán)境保護(hù)稅仍然很難起到較好的污染物減排效果,甚至有可能對(duì)污染的排放非但不會(huì)起到遏制效果反而會(huì)產(chǎn)生促進(jìn)的作用。文章在以下三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行嘗試和創(chuàng)新：第一,在新型城鎮(zhèn)化背景下研究企業(yè)的環(huán)境規(guī)制問題,以企業(yè)行為作為政策與效果的中介橋梁,結(jié)合企業(yè)自身意愿,多方位剖析政策的有效性,宏、微觀相互結(jié)合,研究思路比較新穎。手工收集1140份公司年報(bào)、社會(huì)責(zé)任報(bào)告、環(huán)境報(bào)告,并對(duì)報(bào)告內(nèi)信息進(jìn)行分類整理,為文章的分析提供了比較充足的微觀信息基礎(chǔ)。第二,對(duì)相關(guān)理論的應(yīng)用范圍進(jìn)行拓展并提出一些新的構(gòu)想。具體表現(xiàn)在以下三個(gè)小點(diǎn)：①構(gòu)建出政府、企業(yè)、公眾的三方博弈模型,運(yùn)用演化博弈等工具分析不同情景下政府、企業(yè)、公眾的策略性行為,并從博弈論角度分析中央政府與地方政府的委托代理問題,從而在理論層面對(duì)企業(yè)環(huán)境規(guī)制問題進(jìn)行了比較全面的分析。②提出“企業(yè)綜合價(jià)值最大化”作為新型財(cái)務(wù)管理目標(biāo),并對(duì)其內(nèi)涵加以定義,提出該目標(biāo)的兩種具體衡量方法。③針對(duì)性地設(shè)計(jì)企業(yè)環(huán)境信息報(bào)告格式,為企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的完善和企業(yè)環(huán)境信息數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)的建設(shè)提供實(shí)踐指導(dǎo)。第三,在環(huán)境規(guī)制政策評(píng)價(jià)的方法選擇上有一定新意。文章選取了適當(dāng)方法對(duì)污染治理投資、能效標(biāo)識(shí)、資源稅、排污費(fèi)等環(huán)境規(guī)制政策進(jìn)行效果評(píng)價(jià)。首次從“市場(chǎng)拉力”的角度評(píng)價(jià)能效標(biāo)識(shí)的市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)向作用；結(jié)合供給側(cè)改革,判斷資源稅改革動(dòng)向；在對(duì)排污收費(fèi)制度執(zhí)行效果評(píng)價(jià)和排污費(fèi)與環(huán)境保護(hù)稅比較的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)排污費(fèi)“費(fèi)改稅”做出改革效果預(yù)判。
[Abstract]:At present, the urbanization rate of China has exceeded 50% and entered a new era with urban society as the main body. With the urbanization, the rapid development of industrialization, the excessive consumption of natural resources, the greenhouse effect, the desertification and other environmental problems have become increasingly prominent. The contradiction between urban development and the utilization of resources and energy and environmental maintenance is prominent. The historical task of the country's modernization construction, "the national new urbanization plan (2014-2020 years)" proposed that the concept of ecological civilization should be integrated into the process of urbanization in an all-round way, and to promote green development, circular development and low carbon development. From the source of environmental pollution, industrial pollution is the main source of environmental pollution in China, and the malignant environmental pollution frequently occurred in recent years. The accident shows that many enterprises are developing "competition by bottom" on environmental resources, and the lack of corporate environmental responsibility has caused widespread social concern. Although a relatively complete legal system has been established in China, environmental pollution is still not effectively controlled, and to a certain extent it has been deteriorating to some extent. Therefore, it is an urgent task to build an effective environmental regulation system and guide the enterprises to carry out environmental management in order to realize the fundamental improvement of the ecological environment and ensure the sustainable development of the economy and society. This paper analyzes the strategic behavior of the government, enterprises and the public from the theoretical level with the model and the use of evolutionary game tools. Then, based on the micro perspective of the enterprise, through the collection of the information of enterprise annual report, social responsibility report, environmental report, and sustainable development report, it reveals the present situation of environmental information disclosure in the enterprises, and analyzes the typical cases. The motivation of enterprise environmental management is to discuss the necessity of environmental regulation for enterprises. On the basis of combing our country's environmental regulation policy system and referring to the OECD environmental policy classification method, we classify more than 1400 environmental regulation policies in China, and select typical environmental regulation policies, such as pollution control investment, energy efficiency signs and capital. The implementation effect evaluation of source tax and discharge fee "fee to tax" is carried out to find out the main problems in the formulation and implementation of the current environmental regulation policies. The article further draws on the experience of environmental protection in the development of small towns in Britain and the construction of the environmental information database of OECD countries. Based on the above analysis, a new city is put forward. The main conclusions are as follows: first, the system dynamic equilibrium results of the evolutionary game model show that the enterprise always tends to choose the excess emission from the interest, and the government has a great tendency to choose no environmental regulation, and the public reporting cost is higher than that of the four points. When the effectiveness of success is improved, the public's evolutionary stability strategy is not reported. Increase the punishment of the enterprise's excessive emission, reduce the government's inspection cost as much as possible, increase the public image loss that the environmental damage may bring, and reduce the possibility of the government's inaction. The low public reporting cost is an important condition for the public participation in the supervision of the behavior of the enterprise. Second, the disclosure of environmental information of the listed companies in our country is still dominated by mandatory disclosure, and the proportion of the enterprises to consciously carry out environmental management and voluntary disclosure of information is low; the environmental information disclosure index of high polluting enterprises It is significantly higher than non polluting enterprises; multi channel disclosure helps to improve the content and quality of enterprise environmental information disclosure; the information disclosure of the listed companies for environmental protection is not sufficient, and the effect of capital whereabouts and use is difficult to be observed. Third, the result of typical case analysis shows that even for the leader of the industry, the strength of the company is greatly improved. Environmental performance is still a "luxury" thing. Better financial performance of the company is due to the good market opportunities and technical levels of the company, and it is difficult to see the direct promotion of environmental performance to financial performance. This is also the cause of the enterprise to carry out environmental management to a large extent and promote environmental performance to a large extent. Fourth, the effect of environmental regulation policies, such as industrial pollution control investment, energy efficiency sign, resource tax and pollutant discharge fee, is not ideal. The industrial pollution control investment can play a certain restraining effect on the pollutant discharge, but the increase of industrial pollution control investment can only reduce the emission of pollution contaminants in a very low proportion. The result of market guidance evaluation of energy efficiency signs shows that consumers are not the one with the highest level of energy efficiency, and consumers choose different kinds of household appliances with higher efficiency because of the limit of price and other factors. There is no significant difference in consumer satisfaction after grade household appliances. The energy efficiency level is not a significant factor affecting consumer choice and satisfaction. Because energy efficiency signs are inadequate to the consumption market of energy saving products, the power of the producers of energy saving products will be correspondingly frustrated. The market effect of leather is found in the stage of the decline in the price of resources. The tax burden of the enterprise will have a positive effect on the market value of the resource mining enterprises, and the increase of the unit tax will have a negative impact on the market value of the resource mining enterprises; the market value of the enterprise will be produced on the date of document execution. There is only a very short market effect on the release and implementation of the coal resource tax reform documents. The reform of the coal resource tax is largely to reduce the tax burden of the resources mining enterprises. The effect is negative, but it does not pass the significant test. The discharge fee does not inhibit the emission of COD. Instead, it will significantly increase the emission of COD; the discharge fee will also cause the increase of S02 emissions, but it does not pass the significant test. There is no change in the categories of quasi and pollutants. The reform of the pollutant discharge fee is essentially a shift from the fee to the tax. This study believes that the environmental protection tax after the reform is still very difficult to achieve a better effect of pollutant emission reduction. The following three aspects are tried and innovating: firstly, in the background of the new urbanization, we study the environmental regulation of the enterprise, taking the enterprise behavior as the intermediary bridge of the policy and effect, combining the willingness of the enterprise, analyzing the effectiveness of the policy in many directions, combining the macro and the microcosmic, the research ideas are new. The manual collection of 1140 annual reports of the company, The social responsibility report, the environmental report, and the classification of the information in the report, provide a sufficient basis for the analysis of the article. Second, expand the application scope of the related theories and put forward some new ideas. It is shown in the following three points: (1) the construction of the three party game model of the government, the enterprise and the public. This paper analyzes the strategic behavior of the government, enterprises and the public in different scenarios by evolutionary game, and analyzes the principal-agent problem between the central government and the local government from the angle of game theory, and makes a comprehensive analysis on the problem of enterprise environmental regulation in the theoretical level. Secondly, it puts forward the "maximization of enterprise comprehensive value" as a new type. The aim of financial management is to define its connotation and put forward two specific measures to measure the target. (3) to provide practical guidance for the improvement of enterprise environmental information disclosure and the construction of enterprise environmental information database. (third) the selection of the methods of environmental regulation policy evaluation is certain. The article selects the appropriate methods to evaluate the effect of environmental regulation policies such as pollution control investment, energy efficiency sign, resource tax, discharge fee and so on. It is the first time to evaluate the market orientation effect of energy efficiency signs from the perspective of "market pull", and to judge the trend of the reform of the resources tax reform with the supply side reform, and evaluate the implementation effect of the pollution charge system. Based on the comparison between price and sewage charges and environmental protection tax, the reform effect of "fee to tax" for sewage charges is predicted.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：X322;F279.2
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本文編號(hào)：1893130